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Over the past ten years scientists have perfected revolutionary techniques
in the field of genetic engineering. Although this new technology promises to
have enormous commercial and industrial value, some scientists fear that
the risks accompanying genetic experimentation may outweigh its social
benefits. In their Article Professor McGarity and Mr. Bayer examine the
legal debate over how government should regulate this emerging technology.
After describing various genetic engineering techniques and the risks under-
lying their use, Professor McGarity and Mr. Bayer discuss the elements of a
regulatory framework adequate to handle the new technology and assess the
existing regulatory structure in terms of a more appropriate framework.
They conclude that the appropriate existing federal agencies immediately
should undertake data collection and risk assessments to identify the dan-
gers in the experimentation, manufacture, and practical use of genetically
altered micro-organisms. Professor McGarity and Mr. Bayer recommend
that Congress be prepared to enact new legislation if the existing regulatory
framework fails to meet the challenge of this exciting new technology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970's scientists perfected exciting and controver-
sial techniques for researching the intricate genetic structure of
micro-organisms.' Variously described as "recombinant DNA"
(rDNA), "gene splicing," and "genetic engineering," these new
techniques promised rapid growth in knowledge of genetic
processes.2 At the same time, many scientists were predicting that
this research could pose serious risks to laboratory workers and to
persons living near laboratory facilities.$ Skeptics of the new tech-
nology conjured up hypothetical risk scenarios of pandemics
spawned by the escape of hazardous micro-organisms from univer-
sity and industrial laboratories. 4 Some scientists questioned any
interference with "evolutionary wisdom" absent reliable informa-
tion about the long range effects of the genetic technologies. A
broad scientific, ethical, and philosophical debate ensued in which
participants from many disciplines argued the pros and cons of
governmental regulation of scientific research risks.8 The outcome
of this debate, not surprisingly, was inconclusive. Nevertheless, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) attempted to quell public con-
cerns by promulgating detailed guidelines for the conduct of rDNA
1. For general descriptions of the debate over recombinant DNA (rDNA) research in
the mid-1970's, see J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING GOD (1977); M. ROGERS, BIOHAZARD (1977); N.
WADE, THE ULTIMATE EXPERIMENT (1977); Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits,
Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51
S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1978).
2. See Cohen, Recombinant DNA: Fact and Fiction, 195 SCIENCE 654 (1977); Cohen,
Restriction of Research with Recombinant DNA: The Dangers of Inquiry and the Burden
of Proof, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1081 (1978); David, Potential benefits are large, protective
methods make risks small, CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, May 30, 1977, at 27; Nathan, Potential
Benefits of the Research, in RESEARCH wrrH REcomsiNANT DNA: AN ACADEMY FORUM, 49
(Nat'l Acad. of Sci. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ACADEMY FORUM]; Thomas, Notes of a Biol-
ogy Watcher: The Hazards of Science, 296 NEw ENG. J. MED. 324 (1977).
3. See M. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 31-50; N. WADE, supra note 1, at 29-39.
4. See Cavalieri, New strains of life-or death, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1976, § 9 (Maga-
zine), at 62; Fruits of gene-juggling: blessing or curse?, 17 MED. WORLD NEWS, Oct. 4, 1976,
at 45; The Promise and Peril of Genetic Engineering, NRDC Newsletter, Winter 1976, at 1.
5. See Chargaff, On the Dangers of Genetic Meddling, 192 SCIENCE 938 (1976); Sins-
heimer, Troubled dawn for genetic engineering, 68 NEw SCIENTIST 148 (1975); Wade, Re-
combinant DNA: A Critic Questions the Right to Free Inquiry, 194 SCIENCE 303 (1976)
(reporting views of Dr. Robert Sinsheimer).
6. See ACADEMY FORUM, supra note 2; Grobstein, The Recombinant-DNA Debate, Sc.
AM., July 1977, at 22; Biotechnology and the Law: Recombinant DNA and the Control of
Scientific Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 969 (1978).
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research.7 Although these guidelines were not binding on industrial
research," an institution in which a violation took place could lose
governmental financial support.' With a few exceptions,10 scientists
have recognized that these guidelines place reasonable restraints
on research and have attempted to adhere to them.1"
As more thorough investigations began into the potential risks
of rDNA research, many scientists concluded that the risks which
the presence of altered DNA in numerous common experimental
organisms posed were not nearly as great as some experts origi-
nally had suggested.12 Risk assessments that scientists performed
on selected experimental organisms revealed the low probability
that the organisms would infect human beings or exchange DNA
with an organism capable of infecting humans." The NIH, there-
fore, gradually began to relax its guidelines and even entertained
proposals to eliminate virtually all requirements for most kinds of
7. National Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg.
27,902 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NIH Guidelines]. NIH has amended these guidelines ex-
tensively. The Institute promulgated the most recent version of the guidelines in June 1981.
National Institutes of Health, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, 46 Fed. Reg. 34,462 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NIH Guidelines-1981]; see Karny,
Biotechnology: the Regulatory and Legislative Environment, 5 REcOMBINANT DNA TECHNI-
CAL BULL. 127 (1982).
8. NIH Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. at 27,905. Several states and municipalities, however,
have enacted restrictions similar to the NIH Guidelines that apply to privately sponsored
rDNA research. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 898-910 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (repealed
1982).
9. The NIH has invoked this sanction only once. See Genetic Scientist Is Punished
for Test Violations, Wash. Post, March 23, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
10. Some exceptions do exist. See McGarity, Contending Approaches to Regulating
Laboratory Safety, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 183, 232-34 (1980).
11. See SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 95th CONG., 2D SESs., OVERSIGHT REPORT ON RECOM-
BINANT DNA RESEARCH AND ITS APPLICATIONS (Comm. Print 1978).
12. Dr. Roy Curtiss III made perhaps the most dramatic reassessment of rDNA risks.
Dr. Curtiss was a former proponent of strict controls who changed his position because of
research he performed on those risks. See Letter from Dr. Roy Curtiss III to Dr. Donald
Fredrickson (April 12, 1977), reprinted in Science Policy Implications of DNA Recombi-
nant Molecule Research: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Tech-
nology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1046-55
(1977); see also National Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Research; Final Plan for a
Program to Assess the Risks of Recombinant DNA Research, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,772 (1981)
(NIH director concurs "with most scientists that the perception of risk from this research is
certainly less now than earlier," but recognizes that "there still remain selected areas where
data are insufficient to determine risk.").
13. See National Institutes of Health, Program to Assess the Risks of Recombinant
DNA Research: Proposed First Annual Update, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,874 (1980) (summarizing
risk assessment research on rDNA hosts and vectors).
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rDNA research.14 In the face of strong public comment favoring
retention of mandatory federal controls on gene-splicing research,
NIH settled for a relaxation of the rules. 15
At the same time that anxiety about the hazards of ordinary
research was beginning to wane, researchers were demonstrating
that this new breed of genetic engineering could have enormous
commercial value. Genetically altered bacteria are capable of pro-
ducing an extraordinary variety of marketable chemicals. 6 Indus-
trial application of this research through fermentation technologies
can be extremely profitable because the processes are relatively un-
complicated, utilize inexpensive raw materials, and are not labor
intensive.17 The new genetic research also will make available orga-
nisms capable of performing large-scale industrial jobs such as pol-
lution control and mineral leaching.18
Although some biotechnology firms have encountered prelimi-
nary financial problems, 19 investors generally predict a rosy future
for companies that successfully employ the newly emerging genetic
technologies.2 0 Nevertheless, doubts still linger about the risks that
these technologies may pose to humans and the environment."
14. Gene-Splicing Rules Should be Relaxed, Federal Panel States, Wall St. J., Sep-
tember 14, 1981, at 8, col. 3; see NIH Panel Moving to End Regulation of Gene Splicing,
Wash. Post, April 24, 1981, at A12, col. 1; Deregulation of DNA Studies Sought; Seen as
Boon to University Geneticists, Chronicle of Higher Educ., September 23, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
15. See NIH Unit Votes to Ease but Retain Federal Rules on Gene-Splicing, Wash.
Post, February 9, 1982, at A7, col. 4.
16. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETics ch. 4-5
(1981) [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT]; Aharonowitz & Cohen, The Microbiological Pro-
duction of Pharmaceuticals, Sci. AM., Sept. 1981, at 140; Eveleigh, The Microbiological Pro-
duction of Industrial Chemicals, Sci. Am., Sept. 1981, at 154.
17. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 51; Bull, Ellwood, & Ratledge, The Changing
Scene in Microbial Technology, in MICROBIAL TECHNOLOGY: CuRRENT STATE, FuTURE PROS-
PECTS 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MICROBIAL TECHNOLOGY]; Demain & Solomon, Indus-
trial Microbiology, Sci. AM., Sept. 1981, at 67.
18. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 117-27; Demain & Solomon, supra note 17, at
74.
19. Two biotechnology firms have shut down operations during 1982 pending acquisi-
tion of new capital. Both corporations have filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See Lee Biomolecular Research Labs in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 1 Bio-
TECHNOLOGY L. REP. 98 (1982); Armos Corp. Becomes Third Major Biotech Casualty: Files
Chapter 11, 1 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 125 (1982).
20. See Investors Dream of Genes, TIME, Oct. 20, 1980, at 72; How Pillsbury, Madison
Took Genentech to Market, Am. Law., Dec., 1982, at 22; Genetic Engineers Create New
Breed of Legal Practice, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 21, 1981, at 1, col 1; Hutton Revives Gene Splic-
ing Venture With Changes Reflecting New Tax Law, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1981, at 4, col 3;
cf. Genentech: Is its Glamor Gone?, 211 SCIENCE 262 (1981).
21. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 197-207; Hearings on Industrial Applications
of Recombinant DNA Techniques Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space
1983]
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Nuclear power was one highly touted technology that withered af-
ter its full socio-economic effects became apparent.22 Cautious
commentators have warned that society should not allow the new
genetic technologies to blossom too rapidly before careful examina-
tion and control of all the potential risks have taken place.2 Sev-
eral federal statutes give various agencies authority to regulate
conduct that poses unacceptable risks to humans and the environ-
ment, but the adequacy of any existing regulatory scheme depends
upon the nature of the problem that the agency must address.
This Article examines the applicability of several federal stat-
utes to the emerging genetic technologies. Part II describes some of
the technologies and the risks that they pose. Part III sets out ele-
ments of an adequate regulatory regime for controlling these
unique risks. Part IV measures existing statutory authorities
against the criteria suggested in part III and assesses the extent to
which existing federal agencies have adequate authority to regulate
genetic technologies should this regulation become necessary. Part
V examines whether Congress should enact a separate statute to
address specifically the regulation of the new genetic engineering
technologies. The Article concludes that (1) regulatory agencies
should assess and regulate these new technologies before they
come on line; (2) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
should assemble the expertise necessary to assess the risks and
monitor the development of these technologies, and the courts and
Congress should state expressly that EPA has regulatory authority
in the biotechnology field; (3) if testing determines that these tech-
nologies pose risks to man or the environment, the EPA, the Fed-
eral Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Occupational
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-
13 (1980) (statement of Dr. Anthony Robbins, former director of the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate Hearings].
22. See, e.g., Decommissioning Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Publication No. 80-
6, 10, 14 (Center for Urban and Regional Affairs 1980).
23. See, e.g., Cripps, A Legal Perspective on the Control of the Technology of Genetic
Engineering, 44 MOD. L. REV. 369 (1981); Holden, Ethics Panel Looks at Human Gene
Splicing, 217 SCIENCE 516 (1982) (In testimony before the President's Commission for the
.Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Nicholas
Wade stated that one day scientists will come to a full understanding of the workings of life
and will be in a position to alter the nature of man. Hence, the Commission should look into
the far distant future and discuss setting some firm guidelines.); Karny, Regulation of Ge-
netic Engineering: Less Concern about Frankensteins but time for action on Commercial
Production, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 815, 836 (1981) ("In a situation in which there is uncertainty
and even strong disagreement about the nature, scope and magnitude of the risk, it is diffi-
cult to conclude whether a given solution to the problem is a 'good' or 'poor' one.").
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Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) should assert their reg-
ulatory authorities to ensure public safety; (4) Congress should al-
locate adequate resources to these agencies to ensure that they can
monitor these developing technologies; and (5) if the prevailing
regulatory framework fails to meet the challenge of genetic engi-
neering, then Congress should enact a separate statute to address
specifically the regulatory problems of this new technology.
II. POSSIBLE HAZARDS OF NEWLY EMERGING GENETIC
TECHNOLOGIES
Although predicting all the future uses of genetic technology is
impossible, current and future technologies are divisible for pur-
poses of analysis into three general categories: fermentation tech-
nologies, technologies such as mineral leaching that consist of the
broad application of genetically altered micro-organisms to the en-
vironment, and technologies that use direct manipulation of
human cells. This part of the Article describes the first two classes
of technology and identifies some of the risks that each of them
poses to man and the environment. The third class of technol-
ogy-direct manipulation of human cells-raises a variety of inter-
esting regulatory issues but is beyond the scope of this Article."
A. Fermentation Technologies
Fermentation technologies have served man for thousands of
years.2 5 During the fermentation process a micro-organism, 2 or an
enzyme that a micro-organism produces, transforms one organic
compound into another compound.2 7 The process becomes com-
mercially useful when an organism converts an inexpensive nutri-
ent into a more valuable end product at a relatively low tempera-
24. For a discussion of the regulatory issues that gene therapy raises, see McGarity &
Shapiro, Public Regulation of Recombinant DNA Gene Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 185
(1982).
25. Before 6000 B.C. the Sumerians and Babylonians were using a simple fermentation
process employing yeast, and the Egyptians used the carbon dioxide from yeast to leaven
bread as early as 4000 B.C. Demain & Solomon, supra note 17, at 67.
26. The micro-organisms that industrial fermentation processes most commonly use
are yeasts, molds, bacteria, and filamontous bacteria (actinomy cetes). See Phaff, Industrial
Micro-Organisms, Sci. AM., Sept. 1981, at 77.
27. See Demain & Solomon, supra note 17, at 67. The micro-organism converts nutri-
ents into proteins, which themselves can be commercially valuable. Some proteins, called
enzymes, in turn can convert other raw materials into valuable products. OTA REPORT,
supra note 16, at 50-51; Demain & Solomon, supra note 17, at 70-71. For an explanation of




ture. For example, certain yeasts can convert relatively inexpensive
grains into a variety of valuable alcoholic beverages. 8 Other micro-
organisms can convert inexpensive nutrients into more exotic, if
less palatable, products such as glycerol,29 methane, acetone, an-
tibiotics, carbohydrates, lipids, and other organic compounds."
Although the earliest fermentation technologies employed
micro-organisms that spontaneously infected nutrients,3' greater
understanding of the fermentation process gradually gave rise in
the twentieth century to the discovery and development of special
strains of yeasts, bacteria, and molds that produce special proteins
and other end products. Industrial researchers refined existing
strains through selective mutation to produce organisms that more
efficiently could convert nutrient into end product.3 2 These re-
searchers now believe that the new gene-splicing tools will increase
dramatically the capacity of common industrial micro-organisms to
produce commercially useful products. 33
Practical implementation of gene-splicing research should fol-
low a pattern similar to that used in the pharmaceutical and chem-
ical industries. Two basic processes predominate in these indus-
tries: the "batch" method and the "continuous" approach. 4 Both
processes require aseptic conditions. Foreign contaminants in the
nutrient can interfere with or destroy the useful micro-organisms
28. See Rose, The Microbiological Production of Food and Drink, Sci. AM., Sept.
1981, at 127, 133-36.
29. Demain & Solomon, supra note 17, at 68; see also OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at
92 ("In principle, virtually all organic compounds can be produced by biological systems.").
30. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 50-51.
31. See Rose, supra note 28, at 127.
32. See MICROBIAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 16-20; Demain & Solomon, supra
note 17, at 67-70.
33. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 54-55; Demain & Solomon, supra note 17, at
74.
34. By far the most widely used process in gene-splicing research is the "batch"
method in which a laboratory worker places the micro-organisms, nutrients, and other start-
ing materials in a large stainless steel vessel and stirs them during the fermentation process.
After fermentation is complete, the worker empties the vessel, kills the organisms, and
removes them through filtration or centrifugation. Then the worker separates the end prod-
uct from the remaining liquids. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 51-53; Gaden, Produc-
tion Methods in Industrial Microbiology, Sci. AM., Sept. 1981, at 181. In the less commonly
used "continuous" process, scientists immobilize the micro-organisms on a material such as
alumnia, charcoal, clay, or cellulose. Scientists then supply the nutrients and withdraw the
liquids containing the end products in a steady, continuous stream. Next, they filter and
purify the exhaust liquids as in the batch process. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 21,
at 38 (statement of Dr. Irving S. Johnson, Eli Lilly Corp.); Gaden, supra, at 181. Although
the continuous process has several inherent advantages over the batch process, practical
considerations limit its current use. See id. at 196.
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or the end product. Moreover, unwanted organisms can introduce
toxic impurities into the liquids that may survive the purification
process and contaminate the end product. To avoid contamination,
technicians sterilize the vessel and all starting materials to keep
the micro-organisms scrupulously pure. Even the air entering the
vessel usually is purified. 5 A manufacturer's desire to avoid con-
taminating the fermentation process thus provides a constant in-
centive to minimize the contact between workers and end
products.
3 6
While this natural incentive to avoid contamination operates
in practice to protect workers from exposure to industrial micro-
organisms, worker protection is not a primary goal, and, therefore,
contamination routinely can occur. For example, no independent
incentive exists to avoid worker exposure to micro-organisms after
employees have completed a batch process, although the normal
processing techniques usually ensure that such exposure does not
occur until after the organisms are dead.37 Adequate worker pro-
tection requires some mechanism for monitoring the micro-organ-
ism kills.33 Exhaust gases from forced air fermentation vessels can
expose workers and the environment to potentially pathogenic or-
ganisms. Manufacturers virtually can eliminate this risk of expo-
sure by sterilizing exhaust gases with chemicals or steam. Em-
ployees face possible contact with micro-organisms during the
charging and inoculating process, centrifugation,' 0 and the collec-
35. Gaden, supra note 34, at 184.
36. See Letter from Mr. William Henderson to Dr. William Gartland, reprinted in 6
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO "NIH GumELnSs FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES"
JANUARY 1980-DEcEMBER 1980, at 271 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NIH DOCUMENTS]. Mr.
Henderson states that "[t]he very high cost of mounting the commercial operation of large-
scale biotechnology, e.g., the cost of the medium to fill an industrial-scale fermenter and the
consequences of any contamination tend to ensure that the safety desirable for the growth
of genetically manipulated organisms is likely to be achieved." Id.
37. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 38-39 (testimony of Dr. Irving S.
Johnson); 6 NIH DocuMENTs, supra note 36, at 544-46 (NIOSH walk-through report on
Genentech Corporation).
38. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 39 (testimony of Dr. Irving S. John-
son); 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 443, 447 (statements of Dr. Irving S. Johnson);
id. at 363 (statement of Dr. Anthony Robbins, NIOSH).
39. Large-scale fermenters that use organisms containing rDNA now are able to filter
or incinerate exhaust gases. See 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 443 (statement of Dr.
Irving S. Johnson).
40. Robert McKinney, Basic Practices and Procedures for Hazardous Biologic Opera-
tions-Regulatory Compliance Aspect, Paper presented at First Engineering Foundation
Conference, "Advances in Fermentation Technology," in Boniff, Alberta, Canada (June 7-
12, 1981) (copy on fie with author).
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tion of in-process samples,4' even though the fermentator may be
functioning properly.
Workers and the environment also risk exposure to micro-or-
ganisms during abnormal occurrences such as leaks, spills, and
other breaches of the containment vessels.42 Although companies
employing fermentation technologies contend that major ruptures
of containment vessels have not occurred,43 small leaks have
sprung in the vessels on rare occasions." Technicians, of course,
easily can sterilize leaked material,45 but infection may occur prior
to sterilization efforts. Personal protective devices such as rubber
gloves and masks also can reduce exposure. While scientists have
been unable to trace any major epidemics to exposure of workers
to industrial micro-organisms, the general lack of employee health
data in the fermentation industry precludes concluding that work-
ers are free of micro-organism related infections."
Exposure both to chemicals that the extraction process uses
and to biologically active products and by-products of the fermen-
tation process also can threaten worker safety.47 For example,
worker exposure to synthetic estrogens-products of a fermentation
technology-resulted in numerous physical abnormalities in em-
ployees.48 As companies continue to develop genetic technologies to
produce compounds that are extremely rare in nature, the risks to
workers from abnormally high exposure to end products may
grow. 49 Appropriate adjustments in the physical plants and the
protective devices that employees use, however, can reduce these
risks to acceptable levels.
Most scientists probably would agree that the risks posed by
41. See Memorandum from Dr. Seth Parker to Dr. William J. Gartland (Jan. 25,
1980), reprinted in 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 261.
42. See 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 63 (statement of Dr. LeRoy Walters); id.
at 66 (statement of Dr. Christine Oliver).
43. See id. at 245 (comments of Eli Lilly Co.); id. at 266 (comments of Upjohn Co.); id.
at 282 (comments of Genentech, Inc.).
44. See McKinney, supra note 41, at 9 ("The potential for exposure to aerosols is very
real in large scale operations."); Telephone interview with Dr. David West, NIOSH, (Sep-
tember 21, 1981).
45. See 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 282 (comments of Genentech, Inc.).
46. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 207; 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at
2-3 (statement of Dr. Anthony Robbins).
47. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 204; 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 259
(comments of Coalition for Responsible Genetic Research); 1980 Senate Hearings, supra
note 21, at 12 (statement of Dr. Anthony Robbins).
48. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 11 (testimony of Dr. Anthony Rob-
bins); Telephone interview with Dr. David West, supra note 44.
49. Telephone interview with Dr. David West, supra note 44.
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fermentation technologies which employ micro-organisms contain-
ing well-characterized rDNA5 0 will not be appreciably greater than
the risks that current fermentation technologies create.5 1 Compa-
nies are not likely to use highly infective organisms for fermenta-
tion, given the potential for substantial liability if any accidents
occur and the relative ease of substituting noninfective orga-
nisms.52 Moreover, existing risk assessments indicate that the pres-
ence of a recombinant molecule is not likely to increase the infec-
tivity of a noninfective organism.5 3 The risks, however, may
increase if companies choose to take advantage of the greater flex-
ibility of genetic engineering techniques and use fermentation
technologies to produce more exotic, and perhaps more toxic, prod-
ucts and by-products. Because scientists have only limited experi-
ence with organisms containing recombinant DNA molecules, any
unequivocal statements about the risks that these organisms pose
to humans and the environment are premature.
B. Technologies Consisting of Large-Scale Release of Micro-
Organisms into the Environment
Genetically engineered micro-organisms are capable of serving
human beings beyond the confines of fermentation vessels. For
centuries mining companies have used micro-organisms in leach-
ing-a process that renders valuable metals more soluble and eas-
ily recoverable from low-grade ores. In this process one applies the
micro-organisms directly to the mine spoils and waters them. With
the aid of the bacteria, the metals dissolve and are recoverable
later from the runoff. This technology has the potential to facili-
tate in situ mining of metals such as uranium.5 Similarly, geneti-
cally engineered micro-organisms can be useful in enhancing oil re-
covery from wells in which primary and secondary techniques are
no longer effective. 55
50. See infra text accompanying note 80.
51. Telephone interview with Dr. David Logan, OSHA, (Sept. 24, 1981); Telephone
interview with Dr. Karim Ahmed, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Sept. 22, 1981);
Telephone interview with Dr. David West, supra note 44; Telephone interview with Dr.
Robert McKinney, NIH, (Sept. 18, 1981); see infra note 81 and accompanying text.
52. Interview with Dr. Karim Ahmed, supra note 51; see 1980 Senate Hearings, supra
note 21, at 71 (statement of Dr. David Parkinson).
53. See supra note 13.
54. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 117-19; Demain & Solomon, supra note 17, at
74.
55. Long-chain polymers, such as xanthan gum, can increase the viscosity of water and
thereby improve the ability of injected water to displace oil in underground formations.
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Industrial micro-organisms aid in pollution control. Bacteria
already serve in sewage treatment plants to accelerate the process
of oxidizing organic wastes. New genetic engineering technologies
may yield organisms capable of breaking down harmful pollutants
in the environment into relatively harmless substances. For exam-
ple, the first micro-organism to receive a patent was a bacterium
capable of breaking down chemicals found in oil spills.5 Scientists
also have undertaken to develop organisms that can alter highly
toxic chemicals such as 2, 4, 5-T, and dioxin.
57
In all these technologies, genetically engineered micro-orga-
nisms must enter the environment in large quantities. Widespread
introduction of these organisms greatly reduces the amount of con-
trol over them. Monitoring for their presence is much more diffi-
cult in the natural environment than in relatively clean laborato-
ries, and remedial action presents a greater challenge. Although
the large-scale release of these micro-organisms apparently has not
caused human or environmental harm,58 the possibility exists that
as genetic engineering techniques create exotic strains of poten-
tially useful organisms, one or more of these strains will produce
unwanted side effects. Ideally, scientists would test micro-orga-
nisms with the potential for large-scale application in the labora-
tory and in limited natural settings before releasing them in large
quantities into the environment. Even adequate testing, however,
may not prevent these organisms from acquiring a harmful trait in
the environment or manifesting a deleterious characteristic once
they find an ecological niche.59 The performance of important in-
dustrial jobs through the widespread release of genetically engi-
neered micro-organisms only very recently has become a realistic
Scientists can produce these polymers by standard fermentation technologies and inject
them into wells or, alternatively, produce them in situ by injecting an appropriate micro-
organism and a suitable nutrient. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 119-23. Although in
situ methods have failed in the past, id. at 121, rising oil prices and further research may
combine to yield a workable in situ mechanism.
56. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980); OTA REPORT, supra note
16, at 126-27, 240-41.
57. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 126; 5 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1002 (1981).
58. See M. Levin, Understanding the Environmental Effects of Applied Genetics, Pa-
per Presented at the International Symposium on Epidemiology and Molecular Biology of
Plasmids (Jan. 6, 1981) (copy on file with author).
59. For example, some experts have suggested that an organism capable of digesting
oil spills also might be able to digest oil in its beneficial state. Cf. Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 305 n.1 (1980). Similarly, using genetic engineering techniques to allow plants
to fix nitrogen might alter the entire nitrogen cycle and cause irreversible climatic conse-
quences. See Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy, 45 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 911, 914 n.16 (1977); Lovins, Nitrogen Fixation, 255 NATURE 8, 8 (1975).
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possibility, and the potential environmental effects of this new
technology have received little thought.60
III. ELEMENTS OF AN ADEQUATE REGULATORY REGIME
In the current deregulatory climate any argument for regulat-
ing business conduct must be justifiable as necessary to meet im-
portant societal goals."1 Protecting the environment and the health
and safety of workers and other citizens are, of course, worthy pub-
lic objectives. The question, however, remains whether regulatory
controls over the emerging genetic technologies are necessary to
meet these goals and, if so, whether existing agencies possess suffi-
cient statutory authority to implement appropriate controls. The
brief examination of the risks that might arise from the extensive
unmonitored use of the new genetic technologies 2 indicates the
imprudence of assuming that genetic engineering always will prove
benign. Past experience with other new technologies, such as rail-
roads, automobiles, synthetic organic chemicals, and nuclear
power, warns against the facile assumption that technological
change is costless.
While current predictions concerning the hazards of new ge-
netic technologies admittedly are speculative, caution suggests that
society should examine its existing regulatory mechanisms and de-
cide whether to take protective measures if genetic engineering
proves more dangerous than it currently appears. At the same time
policymakers should be sensitive to the need of a growing and po-
tentially beneficial technology to be free of unnecessary regulatory
constraints.
Society could decide to ignore the possible hazards of these
technologies until evidence of actual harmful effects makes policy-
makers aware of those risks. If society, however, chooses not to ig-
60. EPA currently is making some tentative efforts to study the possible environmen-
tal effects of large-scale applications of genetically engineered micro-organisms. See Levin,
supra note 58; J. Johnson, Year End Report on the Genetic Engineering Planning Study,
prepared for USEPA Advanced Environmental Control Technology Research Center at the
University of Illinois (Dec. 20, 1980) (copy on file with author).
61. Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives,
and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 552 (1979) ("[A]n unregulated marketplace is the norm
and ... those who advocate government intervention must justify it by showing that it is
needed to achieve an important public objective that an unregulated marketplace cannot
provide."); Crandall, Environmental Control is out of Control, CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Apr.
23, 1979, at 29-30; Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. RaV.
1393, 1395 (1981).
62. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
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nore genetic engineering technologies, a host of regulatory options
is available, ranging from requiring companies to disclose informa-
tion relevant to risk assessments to forcing firms to demonstrate
product by product or process by process that the benefits of using
genetically altered organisms exceed the risks. Society, of course,
could select some intermediate regulatory policy, such as requiring
firms to assess continuously the risks that their processes and
products pose, and reporting the results of those assessments to an
agency or the public. Society then would hold in abeyance a re-
serve regulatory capability for addressing problems as they arise.
A. Data Collecting and Monitoring
Perhaps the most important and least intrusive aspect of any
mechanism for regulating human conduct is collecting information
on the need for the regulation. The best way to determine whether
regulation is necessary is to have a means of producing data that
the agency can use to assess the risks present in the practical ap-
plication of a technology. Risk assessments based upon this data
can contribute to the decision whether to regulate and, if so,
whether to impose controls upon the implementation of a particu-
lar technology. In addition, data collection should extenid to the
technology once it is in place to detect unexpected hazards and to
determine whether the regulatory controls are functioning pro-
perly.
The data collection and monitoring mechanism for industrial
applications of genetically engineered micro-organisms should be
capable of compiling a central registry of hosts, vectors, industri-
ally useful genetic sequences, and products and by-products from
genetically engineered micro-organisms." Without this basic infor-
mation those persons within and outside of government who have
an interest in evaluating the risks that genetic technologies pose,
have nothing with which to begin their assessments. The data nor-
mally should be easily obtainable by an agency during the research
and development phase of process and product development. In-
deed, industrial firms are likely to generate this information irre-
spective of any regulatory requirement for the data. The crucial
regulatory question concerns the authority of a regulatory agency
63. Letter from Dr. Eula Bingham to Dr. Donald Fredricksen (Dec. 17, 1979), re-
printed in 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 342, 343 ("A registry of all users of recom-
binant DNA material would be an important step in defining the scope and extent of use of




or independent "public interest" scientist to acquire the informa-
tion and assemble it in a meaningful manner. This access, of
course, would require some grant of power to a regulatory agency
or interested member of the public.
The risk assessor also must have information on the extent to
which humans and the environment are likely to come into contact
with genetically altered micro-organisms before the assessor can
engage in rational attempts to evaluate the risks of such exposure.
Exposure estimates require knowledge about the potential use pat-
terns for the organisms and about the kinds of interactions that
will occur between the environment and the organisms, their prod-
ucts, and by-products as a result of these use patterns.
Regulatees probably will be reluctant to disclose information
voluntarily on the nature of the micro-organisms, products, and
by-products that they intend to use and market, because competi-
tors could use this information to reduce or eliminate the regu-
latees' competitive advantage. 4 Preserving the competitive advan-
tage of someone who has made a useful discovery can protect
incentives to develop beneficial technologies.15 A blanket legal re-
quirement that all firms engaged in genetic engineering reveal in-
formation relevant to the risks of genetic technologies almost cer-
tainly would generate as many requests from competitors as from
governmental agencies and public interest groups. 6 Hence, author-
ity to require companies to disclose commercially sensitive infor-
mation probably should lie within a regulatory agency, rather than
with any member of the public. Since the public, however, has an
obvious interest in the health and environmental aspects of the in-
formation, it should have some access to the data.
For many years the enigma of the "trade secret" status of
health and safety information has plagued attempts by EPA and
FDA to comply with the Freedom of Information Act's disclosure
requirements.2 Perhaps the best approach is a balancing process
that weighs the public interest in disclosure of health and environ-
ment related information against the private interest in nondisclo-
sure of data that incidentally might give other firms a competitive
64. See generally McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARv. L. REV. 837,
848-57 (1980) (innovator could lose substantial lead time by disclosure).
65. Id. at 848-56.
66. See A Battle Over Pesticide Data, 217 SCIENCE 515, 515 (1982).
67. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 64, at 867-82.
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advantage e.6  Since innovative micro-organisms can be patented,
however, the balance probably should weigh in favor of disclosure.
The patent process requires disclosure of all innovative aspects of
a new invention. In return, the holder of the patent receives exclu-
sive use of the invention for seventeen years."' Since a firm can
achieve this protection from its competitors, the government
should require a company that desires to prevent the disclosure of
information relevant to the health and environmental effects of its
products and processes to sustain the burden of demonstrating
that patent protection is insufficient to protect its proprietary
interest.
70
In addition to gathering information about the kinds of orga-
nisms that regulatees use industrially and about the expected in-
teractions between these organisms and the environment, a regula-
tory mechanism should be able to monitor actual application of the
technology for the improper presence of organisms.7 1 Laboratories
or firms should monitor the area around the fermentation tanks
periodically to determine if the organism used in the fermentation
process has escaped. In addition, waste flows should be checked
periodically to validate micro-organism kills. 72 These monitoring
tasks are relatively simple because scientists easily can detect
68. See id. at 863-64.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81
(1974).
70. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 64, at 885; cf. Note, Trade Secrets and the
NLRA; Employees' Right to Health and Safety Information, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 495, 514-15
(1980).
71. NIOSH has suggested the following elements of an adequate monitoring program:
a. Registry of potentially exposed individuals.
b. Work area monitoring program, including air and services, for viable recombinant
DNA host-vector organisms.
c. Direct personnel monitoring for host-vector organisms, and if colonization has oc-
curred, further testing for the expression of the relevant gene product may be
appropriate.
d. Occupational and medical histories, which should include a determination of existing
factors that might place workers at increased risks.
6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 262-63; see id. at 355-56 (statement of Ms. Margaret
Seminario, industrial hygienist, AFL-CIO); id. at 357 (statement of Dr. Christine Oliver,
occupational physician, Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union).
72. See 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 260 (comments of Coalition for Respon-
sible Genetic Research); id. at 443 (description of Eli Lilly Company validation procedures);
id. at 546 (NIOSH report describing and critiquing validation procedure at Genentech Cor-
poration); National Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Research; Physical Contain-
ment Recommendations for Large-Scale Uses of Organisms Containing Recombinant DNA
Molecules, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,968, 24,969-70 (1980) (proposed sections VII-B-2; VII-C-2; and
VII-D-2) [hereinafter cited as NIH Large-Scale Guidelines].
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traces of micro-organisms in the environment by checking for their
presence in nutrient solutions placed around the fermentation
area.7 3 Similarly, laboratories could monitor areas near the loca-
tions of large-scale micro-organism application to determine
whether the organisms are spreading farther than expected. If
policymakers impose regulatory controls upon a particular genetic
technology, a monitoring mechanism would be useful for measur-
ing the effectiveness of those controls.
Finally, a monitoring mechanism should be available to detect
instances of actual human and environmental harm caused by ex-
posure to genetically engineered micro-organisms, their products,
and by-products. Without periodic surveillance of worker health
and the environment surrounding genetic engineering sites, policy-
makers will be unable to tell if more intrusive regulatory controls
are necessary. Even if premanufacture risk assessments indicate a
potential for only minimal harm, a company nevertheless should
monitor workers and others who might come into contact with the
new technology to detect harm when risk assessments are overly
optimistic. In addition to recording systematic and unplanned ex-
posures due to spills and other accidents, a thorough monitoring
program would include periodic medical surveillance of exposed
persons and, in a large-scale release, periodic monitoring of the
surrounding environment.
7 4
73. NIOSH has cautioned that air monitoring must be very thorough to be effective:
Quantitative and qualitative sampling of air and surfaces in the production and labora-
tory areas can be an effective measure of sanitation, environmental conditions, and
efficacy of control measures. Environmental sampling programs have been utilized in
hospitals, the food industry, and containment laboratories for years and the principles
of these programs are applicable to the operations at Genentech. The efficacy, sensitiv-
ity, and accuracy of environmental sampling and analytical techniques should, how-
ever, be considered and their validity must be established prior to utilization. The pro-
cedures analysis, sampling points and sampling schedules, thus established, should be
formalized in writing.
6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 549.
74. The NIH has proposed a monitoring program for large-scale activities that use
organisms which require P3-LS containment at the laboratory level. "The program shall
include: preassignment and periodic physical and medical examination; collection, mainte-
nance and analysis of serum specimens for monitoring serologic changes that may result
from the employee's work experience; and provisions for the investigation of any serious,
unusual or extended illnesses of employees to determine possible occupational origin." NIH
Large-Scale Guidelines, supra note 72, at 24,968.
The Eli Lilly Company voluntarily has adopted an employee medical surveillance pro-
gram for its rDNA fermentation operations. This plan includes an annual physical examina-
tion and screen collection. See 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 64, 445-56, 507. See
also id. at 545 (Genentech Corporation employees working with human growth hormone and
interferon subject to fecal monitoring). The Cetus Corporation does not require annual
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To avoid potential tort and workers' compensation claims
regulatees may monitor voluntarily for the presence of genetically
engineered micro-organisms in improper places and for illness and
environmental damage caused by the organisms.75 Without a legal
requirement to monitor, however, some firms may choose blissful
ignorance. A company may adopt the attitude that what the com-
pany does not know, the workers will not know, and what the
workers do not know cannot hurt the company. Even if most firms
do not adopt this short-sighted view, they may not be willing to
share their data with regulatory agencies and the public when the
monitoring could reveal possible health problems or violations of
regulations or guidelines. The legislature, therefore, might consider
giving a governmental agency the authority to command access to
genetic engineering firms so that the agency can monitor for regu-
lar and irregular releases of genetically engineered micro-orga-
nisms. The legislature could go still further and require enforcea-
ble self-monitoring of micro-organism releases. 78 Finally, to ensure
that the regulator discovers actual harm as soon as possible, the
legislature could give the agency authority to require firms to re-
port systematically on planned and unplanned exposures to the or-
ganisms and to engage in periodic medical and environmental sur-
veillance of exposed humans and the environment.
B. Risk Assessment
Like the common-law courts, which rarely invoke their author-
ity until after a harm has occurred, the legislature may elect to
assume an entirely passive stance with respect to the risks posed
by newly emerging genetic technologies. Experience with other po-
tentially dangerous technologies, however, repeatedly has demon-
physical examinations, but all employees on sick leave must have clearance from a physician
before returning to work. Furthermore, the company excludes employees with open wounds
or on antibiotic therapy from rDNA areas. Id. at 559. NIOSH plans to develop guidelines for
medical surveillance techniques for companies using genetically engineered micro-orga-
nisms. See Memorandum from Dr. Anthony Robbins to Dr. Gilbert S. Omenn (June 11,
1980), reprinted in 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 372-73; see also 6 NIH DOCU-
MENTS, supra note 36, at 494 (statement of Dr. Anthony Robbins).
75. Eli Lilly Company, for example, conducts periodic environmental monitoring
around its 150-liter rDNA fermentor. The monitoring program measures the exhaust gases
and the general room environment twice a week with both air samples and plate samples.
See 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 64, 445, 507. See also id. at 544 (description of
environmental monitoring at Genentech Corporation); id. at 260 (comments of Coalition for
Responsible Genetic Research).
76. See Clean Water Act § 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(requiring self-monitoring of spills on navigable waters).
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strated the value of assessing the risks to man and the environ-
ment before the technologies attain widespread use.7" A legislature,
therefore, may choose to charge some governmental entity with the
duty of regularly assessing the risks to society that may arise from
industrial processes which utilize genetically engineered micro-or-
ganisms. Thorough risk assessments may demonstrate that no reg-
ulation is necessary beyond periodic monitoring for unexpected
health and environmental effects. Moreover, risk assessments can
guide decisionmakers to the most appropriate regulatory ap-
proaches, if the government deems that regulation is needed.78 Ab-
sent adequate risk assessments, however, society will learn that a
technology is malignant only after it has damaged-perhaps irrep-
arably-human life or the environment.7
An appropriate risk assessment of the industrial use of geneti-
cally engineered micro-organisms would consist of at least three
kinds of analyses. First, a genetically altered micro-organism
should undergo a thorough characterization. This characterization
should include analyses of the structure of the organism's DNA,
the ability of the organism as altered to infect humans and other
77. See The Technology Assessment Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 797 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§
471-481 (1976); Danhof, Assessment Informations Systems, in TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 7,
9-10 (R. Kaspar ed. 1969); Speth, The Federal Role in Technology Assessment and Control,
in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 420 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
78. See R. LAVE & S. OMENN, CLEARING THE AIR: REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 18
(1981). ("The approach of specifying the nature of the risks and analyzing the kinds of
effects and numbers of people to be affected at each level of exposure allows a rational
assessment of acceptable remaining risks in light of the feasibility of compliance with alter-
native standards."). See Comparative Risk Assessment, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, No.
129, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Risk Benefit Analysis in the Legislative Process, Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm.
on Science and Technology and the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, No. 71, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
79. The FDA experience with Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is one example of inadequate
risk assessment that resulted in unforeseen and widespread tragic effects. Doctors pre-
scribed DES for years to women with estrogen deficiencies, to pregnant women to prevent
miscarriage, and as a "morning after" contraceptive, before further analysis of the drug's
long-term effects revealed its cancer-causing nature. S. HADDEN, DES AND THE FDA: THE
USES OF TECHNICAL ADVICE IN REGULATORY POLICY-MAKING 9-11 (Southern Center for Stud-
ies in Public Policy 1976). As many as 1.5 million American women took the synthetic hor-
mone before Dr. Arthur Herbst discovered that the drug caused rare vaginal cancer, an
increase in premature deliveries, pregnancy loss, and possible infertility among daughters of
women who took the drug. Miscarriages, Early Births Higher in 'DES Daughters,' Wash.
Post, Jan. 25, 1980, at A8, col. 1. See also HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, 91ST
CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACAD. OF SCIENCES: TECHNOLOGY, PROCESSES OF
ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE 1 (Comm. Print 1969).
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organisms, the pathogenicity of the organism, and the possible
products and by-products of the organism.80 Second, if the charac-
terization of the organism reveals that it could infect humans or
other organisms, the risk assessment should attempt to estimate
the probability that human and environmental exposure to the or-
ganism would be of sufficient duration and concentration to create
the potential for damage in the infected entity.81 Last, the assess-
ment should estimate the risks to humans and the environment
attributable to exposure to the chemical products and by-products
of the industrial process.8 2
The governmental entity that performs these risk assessments
need not be a regulatory agency. Indeed, an independent govern-
mental agency that has no regulatory role, such as NIH, could per-
form the analyses to ensure objectivity in the assessments. Risk
assessment is by nature a highly speculative enterprise. Substantial
uncertainties inevitably accompany any serious effort to assess the
potential harm to society of a particular technology. The goals of
public policy ultimately determine the extent of preventative regu-
latory controls on any industrial activity. Nevertheless, risk assess-
ments can be very helpful to legislatures and agencies deciding
whether to regulate and which regulatory options to adopt.
80. Characterization of genetically altered micro-organisms is sufficiently important to
the director of the NIH that the NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research prohibit
experiments using more than 10 liters of culture "unless the recombinant DNAs are rigor-
ously characterized and the absence of harmful sequences established." NIH Guide-
lines-1981, supra note 7, § I-D-6, at 34,463.
81. Several organizations already have undertaken to study the survivability of geneti-
cally altered organisms in animals and the environment. See National Institutes of Health,
Program to Assess Risks of Recombinant DNA Research; Proposed First Annual Update, 45
Fed. Reg. 61,874 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NIH Program to Assess Risks]. These studies
generally have concluded that the danger of pathogenic infection from commonly used
micro-organisms is very low. See National Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Re-
search; Final Plan for a Program To Assess the Risks, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,772 (1981); NIH
Program to Assess Risks, supra, at 61,874. EPA also is planning studies to evaluate the
potential hazards of industrial application of genetic engineering. See J. Johnson, supra
note 60; M. Levin, supra note 58.
82. Methods for assessing the human and environmental risks due to exposure to
chemicals in the environment are familiar, if occasionally controversial. See, e.g., NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING THE SAFETY OF FOOD
CHEMICALS (1970); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PRINCI-
PLES FOR EVALUATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (1975); NATIONAL CANCER ADVISORY
BOARD SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS, GENERAL CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING
THE EVIDENCE OF CARCINOGENICITY OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES (1976); Leape, Quantitative





The risk assessments that scientists already have made on
many micro-organisms indicate that industrial use of these orga-
nisms may pose very few risks to man and the environment. Most
experimental strains of E. coli, for example, do not appear to be
capable of infecting human beings or of exchanging genetic mate-
rial with "wild" organisms that can infect humans.8 3 The tests,
however, are not conclusive and more experiments are necessary
before scientists can say with confidence that genetically altered E.
coli poses no threat to exposed humans.84 Moreover, genetic engi-
neers are experimenting with organisms, such as bacillus subtillis,
streptomyces, and saccharomyces, which they must assess further
for potential risks.85 Different organisms may present a whole new
set of environmental hazards.
If future risk assessments demonstrate that industrial applica-
tion of genetically engineered micro-organisms poses little or no
threat to society, erection of a specific regulatory structure capable
of controlling risky aspects of that technology may be unnecessary.
Scientists, however, are far from being able to draw this conclu-
sion. Since genetic technologies presently appear relatively safe,
policymakers may prefer to forego more intrusive regulatory mech-
anisms until risk assessment results indicate otherwise. Consider-
ing, however, how long Congress takes to react to serious health
and environmental problems," some speculation may be useful
83. See Korwek, OSHA Regulation of Industrial Applications of Recombinant DNA
Technology, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 284, 289-90 (1981).
In general, it has been found that E. coli and yeast are not pathogenic, cannot be made
pathological by insertion of rDNA sequences, and do not implant in the intestinal
tracts of laboratory animals or humans. In addition, E. coli and yeast containing rDNA
sequences are not easily transmitted to other microorganisms, nor are they likely to
survive in a competitive environment.
Id. at 290.
84. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENETIC ENGINEERING, HUMAN GENET-
ICS, AND CELL BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES, BIOTECHNOLOGY (SUPPLEMEN-
TAL REPORT III) 9 (Comm. Print 1980).
While accepting the expert's assurances that it is virtually impossible to convert E. coli
K-12 into a pathogen, there is no harm in recollecting that even totally defined, man
made systems ... occasionally produce surprises .... [O]nly a third of the metabolic
activities which take place in E. coli K-12 are known at present, and it may take an-
other 20 to 25 years before we approach the state of knowing them thoroughly, accord-
ing to James Watson.
Id. at 48-49 (citation omitted).
85. See 6 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 447 (statement of Dr. Irving S. Johnson).
86. Two examples of congressional delay are the enactments of the Toxic Substances
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about what regulatory mechanisms would be appropriate if the
dangers associated with genetic technologies were to increase.
A policymaker has several regulatory options from which to
choose in addressing genetic technologies. The options exhibit va-
rying degrees of intrusiveness, and range from performance stan-
dards to a requirement that the government license each technol-
ogy. The purpose of this Article is to discuss broadly the kinds of
options that are available to legislatures and regulatory agencies.
An examination of four dimensions of health and environmental
regulation is useful in gaining this overall view. A policymaker can
focus upon (1) the nature of the regulatory statement that the
agency articulates; (2) the nature of the immediate regulatory goal;
(3) the addressee of the regulatory statement; and (4) the focus of
the regulatory statement. These dimensions are not mutually ex-
clusive. The particular regulatory strategy that the legislature or
regulatory agency adopts will depend inter alia upon the nature of
the regulatory problem, the degree of protection required, and the
degree of intrusiveness that the policymaker desires.
Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981), and the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445-532
(1977). Toxic control legislation originated in 1971 in response to a report by the Council on
Environmental Quality emphasizing an increasing need for regulation. During the 92d and
93d Congresses, both the House and Senate separately passed legislation. Because of delay
in passing the House bill and the inability of the Conference Committee to reach a compro-
mise between the bills, however, all legislation died at the end of each session. The 94th
Congress in 1976 finally enacted the current statute, which had its origin in an earlier Sen-
ate bill (S. 1478). Gaynor, The Toxic Substances Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30
VAND. L. REv. 1149, 1150 (1977).
The SMCRA took six years to enact. The 90th Congress held the first hearings in 1971
but neither the 90th nor the 91st Congress reported any legislation. During the 92d Con-
gress, the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels unanimously reported a bill to
the Senate (S. 630) and reserved the right to amend it on the floor. The House passed a
similar bill (H.R. 6482) in October 1972, but the 92d Congress recessed before the Senate
could consider either bill. During the 93d Congress the Senate drafted compromise legisla-
tion (S. 425) that met a pocket veto by the Ford Administration at the end of that Congress.
On February 6, 1975, the President drafted suggested changes to the proposed bills; senators
realized that eight of those changes were crucial for Administration approval. At the begin-
ning of the 94th Congress, a joint bill incorporated a majority of the suggested changes. The
changes were inadequate, however, and President Ford vetoed this bill May 20, 1975; the
House almost overrode the veto on June 10, 1975, but failed to do so by three votes. Later in
the same session, Congressmen introduced two bills that met Administration requirements,
but both failed in Congress. President Carter finally signed the current act into law in 1977.
Comment, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 9 ST. MARY's L.J.
863, 863 & n.1 (1978).
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1. The Nature of the Regulatory Statement
The current occupational safety and pollution control statutes
contain two approaches to health and environmental regulation:
the "command and control" approach and the "incentive" ap-
proach.81 The command and control approach is the regulatory
technique best known to lawyers-the regulatory entity proscribes
certain conduct, and anyone who engages in that activity can face
a civil or criminal fine or perhaps even incarceration."" The com-
mand and control approach requires the standard-setter to be very
familiar with the operations and vocabulary of the regulated enter-
prise and the nature of its unwanted effects so that the standards
can proscribe "bad" conduct without unduly inhibiting "good"
conduct.8 9 The approach also requires that the standard-setter
draw clear and definite lines between acceptable and unacceptable
conduct because ambiguity can precipitate attempts to prevent ac-
ceptable conduct, particularly in the grey areas.9 0 Since standards
can have severely negative effects on the regulated entities, the
command approach requires that these entities be able to partici-
pate in the promulgation of the rules and challenge those that are
arbitrary or lack support.9 1 Unfortunately, this aspect of the pro-
87. Perhaps the most articulate description of this basic distinction appears in C.
SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977). The distinction, however, is com-
mon in the literature on the economics of regulation. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLU-
TION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY 91 (1975); B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULA-
TION 342-56 (1980).
88. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 2616 (1976); Occupational
Safety and Health Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1976); Clean Water Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319
(1976); Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (Supp. V 1981); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
89. Hays, Political Choice in Regulatory Administration, in REGULATION IN PERSPEC-
TIVE, HISTORICAL ESSAYS 124, 129 (T. McCraw ed. 1981) ("If one were to require that pollu-
tion control technology used by the 'best' firms be applied to all, one had to have a clear
notion of the range of technology in place for existing firms so as to know which would serve
as examples for others."). See F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON, & S. TAY-
LOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 12 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT]; C. SCHULTZE, supra note 87, at 20.
90. Spence & Weitzman, Regulatory Strategies for Pollution Control, in APPROACHES
TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 199, 202 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978) ("Frequent changes in
regulations may create serious implementation problems for a well-intentioned business
management.").
91. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 12-15. "If an agency decides to be
strict and impose standards that an industry thinks cannot be met, it must fight industry
experts in administrative proceedings and in court." Id. at 14. See Henderson & Reason,
Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1429, 1438 (1978) (In some cases the agency will lack sufficient expertise and
will have to "rely on those possessing the expertise-in most instances, the same firms
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cess offers a recalcitrant regulatee numerous opportunities for
obfuscation and delay. Moreover, the command approach requires
an effective enforcement agency capable of monitoring the conduct
of regulated entities to observe whether or not they are complying
with the standard-setter's directives."2
The incentive approach attempts to guide rather than pre-
scribe the regulatees' conduct. The regulator seeks to induce con-
duct indirectly by rewarding "good" conduct with grants or tax
breaks and penalizing "bad" conduct with charges or other eco-
nomic costs." While the command approach generally requires the
standard-setter to supersede the market,94 under the incentive ap-
proach the intervening governmental entity must supplement the
market by making undesirable conduct more costly.9 5 Policymakers
might devise an incentive-based scheme to allow individual firms
the freedom to achieve a required goal, such as fewer workplace
deaths or fewer dead fish in a nearby lake, through source- or re-
ceptor-oriented technologies.9 6
which are to be regulated-for substantial assistance in the rulemaking process.").
92. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 8 ("[A]ll programs require that
discharges and ambient quality be monitored; there is no escaping this technological
imperative.").
93. Several distinct types of incentive-based regulatory regimes exist. The scheme that
economists advocate most commonly for remedying "spillover" problems is the "tax" or
"charge" system under which the regulatee must pay an agency a charge for each unit of
undesirable conduct. See id. at 14-17; A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 87, at 99-101.
Under an alternative "marketable permit" approach, the regulatory entity identifies in ad-
vance-usually in accordance with some media quality-based standard-the quantity of un-
desirable conduct that is socially acceptable. The regulatory entity then auctions off the
right to engage in this conduct to the highest bidders and prohibits anyone from engaging in
that conduct except pursuant to a purchased right. After the initial auction the rights are
freely transferable. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 21; Rose-Acker-
man, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 CAN. J. EcoN. 512 (1973); Rose-Ackerman, Market
Models for Water Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25 PUB. POL'" 385
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Market Models].
94. Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives,
and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 549, 561 (1979) ("[T]he relation between the regulator and
the affected industries is often adversary, for the regulator is to lead the industry to perform
in a manner different from that dictated by the unregulated market.").
95. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 29-30 ("[A] market approach] re-
quire[s] those wishing to discharge pollutants into the air or water. . .to pay for these uses
of the common property resources."); Kelman, Economists and the Environmental Muddle,
64 PUB. INTEREST 106 (Summer 1981).
96. Source-oriented regulatory schemes concentrate on companies whose waste emis-
sions make them sources of pollution. Receptor-oriented approaches focus on the persons
who might come in contact with the pollution. Most current suggestions for incentive-based
regulatory approaches do not give the regulatory entity the authority to allow the regulated
firms to choose between source- and receptor-oriented schemes. The proposals would levy
pollution taxes upon units of pollution, not upon units of damage. Similarly, regulatees
484
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Unless regulators are content to use incentives on an ad hoc
experimental basis, they need information upon which to base pre-
dictions about the incentive's impact on the quality of the receiv-
ing media and/or its impact on the regulated firms.91 Moreover,
while the regulatory entity in an incentive system does not have to
police individual regulatee compliance with detailed standards,
nevertheless, it needs an enforcement mechanism capable of de-
tecting "cheaters" who, in effect, attempt to "steal" a clean envi-
ronment or safe workplaces from society.9 8
The primary advantage of the incentive approach to regula-
tion is its efficiency. It allows regulated firms to achieve a given
level of health and environmental protection in the most cost-ef-
fective manner.9 9 Furthermore, the incentive theory gives regulated
firms a great degree of freedom to mix "process" and "end of pipe"
controls to meet the special circumstances of individual plants. 100
Genetic technology firms would fully realize these advantages. An
incentive approach is an especially attractive means of regulating a
new technology that requires the construction of new facilities be-
cause the regulated entity has the widest range of options when it
is designing a facility from scratch. Furthermore, an innovative
new industry that has not settled into established technologies
desires flexibility to choose which control technologies are most
suitable to its circumstances.
Despite the enthusiastic endorsement of economists and other
policy analysts, the incentive approach has not proved attractive to
policymaking bodies. Congress briefly flirted with the notion of a
tax on sulfur emissions in the early 1970's but rejected the idea for
a number of reasons-many of them probably unrelated to the
proposal's merits. 10' Professor Kelman recently has reported that
opposition to a "charge" approach remains strong, especially
would receive pollution rights for units of pollution, not for units of health or environmental
harm. If an agency could craft these techniques in units of environmental harm rather than
in units of pollution, sources would be free to choose between source- and receptor-oriented
techniques.
97. B. MITNIK, supra note 87, at 353; Solow, The Economists' Approach to Pollution
and Its Control, 173 ScIENcE 498, 501 (1971).
98. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 32-37; C. SCHULTZE, supra note
87, at 42; Market Models, supra note 93, at 395.
99. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 9, 33, 151; B. MITNICK, supra note
87, at 376.
100. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 10, 34; A. KNEESE & C.
SCHULTZE, supra note 87, at 87-91; B. MrrNICK, supra note 87, at 376.
101. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 89, at 52-53; A. KNEESE & C.
SCHULTZE, supra note 87, at 100.
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among industry representatives and liberal congressional staff-
ers.1" 2 Environmentalists appear to be split on the issue.
1 03
The general lack of enthusiasm for the incentive approach
stems primarily from its three disadvantages. First, the incentive
approach is difficult to enforce. Often the kind of conduct that
threatens human health or the environment is not easily divisible
into discrete units for convenient metering. Second, an incentive
system requires the regulated firm to incur immediate and con-
stant costs unrelated to the productivity of the target activity.
While incentives give management greater flexibility than do com-
mands, no opportunity exists under the incentive system for vari-
ances or other ameliorative measures. The firm immediately must
absorb fees or the cost of marketable permits in its operating
budget. Hence, while an incentive scheme might be more attractive
to a firm in the long run, its immediate costs cause management to
be wary of that approach. Last, the incentive approach is unsuita-
ble to hazards of a catastrophic nature. When conduct entails a
very small probability of a very high consequence accident, the
regulatory entity must ensure that the accident never happens.
Obviously, fines or fees make little sense when a firm's conduct has
caused the death of 50,000 people. While conceivably the regula-
tory entity could adapt an incentive scheme to discrete units of
risk, rather than to units of damage, the legal literature has not
explored this option in detail.
The disadvantages of an incentive approach pertain directly to
the regulation of genetic technologies. Agencies might have diffi-
culty determining the units of worker health or environmental dis-
ruption attributable to infections by harmful organisms or damage
from toxic products and by-products. If a particular organism or
its by-products posed only a low risk of infection or other health
effects, regulators might set a fee based upon the frequency of the
micro-organism's release from the containment area."0 " This option
would require continuous monitoring for the presence of organisms
and by-products outside the area. The expense of monitoring
might be prohibitively high. Although assessing firms a minimal
fee based on the release of relatively harmless organisms and by-
102. Kelman, supra note 95, at 109.
103. Id. at 111.
104. While this approach more easily is applied to enclosed systems such as fer-
menters, nevertheless, it is adaptable to large-scale release technologies. The difficulty with
the latter application is in defining the containment area outside which the organism or its
by-products should not spread.
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products would encourage firms to minimize releases, this measure
also would represent an acknowledgement of the inevitability of
those releases. This option obviously would be inappropriate for
organisms and by-products that posed a relatively high risk of seri-
ous harm to health or the environment.
Firms considering entry into the new field may object to the
immediate costs that an incentive system imposes upon them. New
firms should not have strong objections because they can avoid fees
by designing controls into the new plants. Nevertheless, many of
the newer firms entering the genetic engineering field must strug-
gle for sufficient capital to begin scale-up activities. They are likely
to oppose an incentive system just as vociferously as they would
oppose any regulatory requirement that has no promise of increas-
ing the ultimate profitability of their enterprise.
The incentive approach operating alone is inappropriate for a
technology that uses hazardous organisms. Some scientists still
paint scenarios of epidemics and devastating environmental degra-
dation caused by industrial use of genetic technologies. Certainly
the use of some hosts might result in great harm to health and the
environment if the organisms escaped the confinement area. While
no firms at present indicate any desire to utilize highly infective
organisms in industrial genetic engineering, in the event that they
choose to do so in the future, the government may decide to use an
incentive approach reinforced by a more intrusive regulatory
scheme.
2. The Nature of the Immediate Regulatory Goal
Almost every existing regulatory regime adopts either a media
quality-based, 10 5 a technology-based,0 8 or a balancing approach'
07
105. A media quality-based approach focuses primarily upon the quality of the receiv-
ing medium. The first step is to articulate a general goal for the receiving medium. Policy-
makers could specify this standard with great particularity-for example, no more than 150
dead fish or 100 cases of human cancer per year-but more often the goal is expressed in
more hortatory terms, such as fishable/swimmable water. A regulatory entity then deter-
mines the level of pollutant-or other unit of unacceptable conduct-in the receiving me-
dium to meet the goal. See, e.g., 1 EPA, Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter and
Sulfur Oxides, External Review Draft No. 2 (Feb. 1981) (unreleased preliminary draft). The
regulator probably will have to estimate the environmental and health effects of the pollu-
tant in the receiving medium at various concentrations. Id. Using a model that relates dis-
charges from individual facilities to media quality, the regulator calculates the pollution
load for locations that meet the standard and the pollution reduction load for sites that
exceed the permissible level. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905
(1974); Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); cf. EPA 600/5-76-
004, Evaluation of Water Quality Models: A Management Guide for Planners (July 1976).
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to health and environmental regulation. The media quality and
Finally, the regulating entity apportions the load among the existing sourses and perhaps
saves some portion of the available load for future sources. See Clean Air Act § 110, 42
U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. V 1981); Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976 & Supp. V.
1981); TEXAS AIR CONTROL BOARD-TEXAS STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, CONTROL STRATE-
GIES (March 30, 1979). Of course, if the entire load in a relevant media quality region is
attributable to a single source, as would happen with most detrimental aspects of genetic
technologies, then allocation is not necessary and the regulatory entity simply can use its
reduction model to work backwards from the desired level of media quality to an effluent or
emission limitation for the source. The agency monitors the sources and the receiving media
to detect violations of limitations and to determine whether the load reduction model func-
tioned properly.
106. Under the technology-based approach the legislature specifies in broad terms,
such as "best available technology," Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976 &
Supp. V. 1981), or "lowest achievable emission rate," Clean Air Act § 171, 42 U.S.C. §
7501(3) (Supp. V 1981), the degree of pollution control technology that it expects regulated
industries to implement, regardless of the impact on the quality of the receiving media.
Pollution control technology does not refer simply to end of pipe technologies. Changes in
design, in the operation of the basic units of production, and in the way that employees
perform their tasks can reduce pollution as effectively-and often more cheaply than-end
of pipe methods. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 87, at 24.
After the standard-setter has articulated its expectation regarding pollution control
technology, it divides the various regulated industries into categories and subcategories ac-
cording to the production processes they employ, the nature of the product and waste
stream, the age of the facilities, the costs of pollution control, and other elements that ap-
pear relevant to the standard-setter and its engineers. The standard-setter next examines
the pollution control technologies in use in the regulated industry and in industries with
similar waste streams. The regulator also studies the technologies that may be at the pilot
plant or at even less advanced stages of development. The regulator then picks a technology
that best meets the statutory criteria. Since cost invariably is one criterion, the standard-
setter must consider economic as well as technological feasibility. The standard-setter must
specify the degree of effluent reduction attainable within each category and subcategory and
write a standard, expressed as units of pollutant per unit of production, input, or discharge
that mandates that degree of effluent or emissions reduction. 40 C.F.R. §§ 400-460 (1982).
Promulgation of a technology-based standard need not occur industry-wide or even
subcategory-wide. In principle, each individual source of pollutant could have a technology-
based standard. The standard-setter then would act very much like a court and adjudicate
the economic and technological feasibility of various suggested pollution control alternatives
for each source. The approach, however, would entail enormous administrative costs. Never-
theless, at least one circuit court interpreted the Clean Water Act to require case by case
technology-based standard-setting by local permitting authorities before the Supreme Court
in E. L Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1976), held that EPA has the
authority to promulgate national limitations. See CPC Int'l , Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329,
1331-32 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1976). Although regulators more
commonly associate incentive approaches with media quality standards, a technology-based
regime could adopt a less direct approach and require the standard-setter to establish a
charge of effluent or emissions tax, rather than an effluent or emissions limitation, to induce
the regulatee to adopt the desired degree of technology.
Statutes nearly always give individual sources the freedom to meet the promulgated
standard with any technology that they choose to adopt so long as it performs as well as the
technology that the agency selected. The standard-setter rarely receives the authority to
mandate the actual use of particular technologies. See Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412
(Supp. V 1981). The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) gives OSHA the flex-
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technology approaches represent two extremes on a continuum,
and the balancing approach lies somewhere between them. The
pure technology-based approach ignores media quality considera-
tions and the pure media quality-based scheme fails to take ac-
count of economic and technological feasibility. In reality, regula-
tory agencies rarely apply either approach in its pure form.
Agencies invariably consider feasibility in setting media quality-
based standards, if only covertly to decide a satisfactory level of
cleanliness. Similarly, media quality considerations intrude into
the determination of technology-based standards when the appli-
cation of the best possible technology clearly will bring about no
health or environmental benefit.
The question where along the continuum the legislature ought
to locate a regulatory strategy is the subject of sharp debate among
students of the regulatory process.10 8 While a thorough rehearsal of
the debate is beyond the scope of this Article, the piece does dis-
cuss some of the primary advantages and disadvantages of various
positions on the continuum in the context of regulating genetic
technologies. The primary disadvantage of the media quality-based
approach is the difficulty in determining what level of exposure to
a substance creates too much risk. Some toxic and infectious
agents appear to be harmless to most people and the environment
below a certain threshold level. With an appropriate margin of
safety, a regulatory entity can set media quality-based standards
for these agents so that human and environmental exposure does
not exceed this level. Identification of this safety level for other
agents, however, is more difficult.109 Determining the effects of low
ibility to require the implementation of specific "practices, means, methods, operations or
processes . . . . " Occupational Safety and Health Act § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
107. The balancing approach, which falls between the media quality and technology
theories on the regulatory continuum, measures the costs of greater controls against the
predicted benefits of those controls. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act,
as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136 (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. 94-469, 90
Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629); Liroff, Cost Benefit Analysis in Fed-
eral Environmental Programs, in COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
POLITICS, ETHICS AND METHODS 35, 47 (D. Swartzman, R. Liroff, & K. Croke eds. 1982). The
balancing approach thus requires the regulatory entity to consider both the harm that the
discharge causes to the receiving medium and the economic and technological feasibility of
reducing the discharge.
108. Cost Benefit Analysis: The Potential of Conflict of Interest, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
109. Most scientists would agree that establishment of a threshold level for most car-
cinogens is impossible. See McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Adminis-
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level or accidental exposure to toxic or infectious agents requires a
substantial amount of expensive information derived from epide-
miological studies and tests with laboratory animals.110 Further-
more, most populations include sensitive individuals who may suf-
fer harm from exposures that would be below the threshold level
for the rest of the population. In genetic technologies, establishing
an appropriate level of exposure would be especially difficult be-
cause the technology is new and rapidly changing. By the" time the
regulatory entity has assessed the effects of a particular genetically
engineered organism and its products and by-products, the tech-
nology may have changed to a new organism. The manufacturer
may have modified the organism intentionally to meet production
needs or the organism could have changed spontaneously through
mutation or other natural causes. Thus, the target of the regula-
tion is constantly moving. This problem of shifting technology also
has plagued attempts to assess the health effects of products of the
rapidly evolving chemical industry.1
Another problem with media quality-based standards results
from the uncertainties that are inherent in translating a level of
trative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA,
67 GEo. L.J. 729, 733-34 (1979).
110. The continuing controversy over the health effects of dioxin, a contaminant of the
pesticide 2, 4, & 5-T, illustrates the difficulty in determining a threshold level for a potent
teratogen. See Notice of Intent to Cancel the Forestry, Rights-of-Way and Pasture Registra-
tions of Pesticide Products Containing 2, 4, 5-T, 44 Fed. Reg. 15,893, 15,894 (1979).
111. In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 3, 1978), petitioners challenged the toxic effluent standards that EPA set for
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), an industrial chemical used widely in solvents, plasticiz-
ers, adhesives, and textile coatings, but principally in electrical equipment. PCBs may vary
in the number of chlorine atoms per molecule and are separable into "more chlorinated"
and "less chlorinated" categories. Id. at 1354. Use of less chlorinated PCBs increased rap-
idly in the early 1970's and created a "knowledge gap" about their effects. Id. at 1354 n.17.
EPA faced this gap when it complied with a court-ordered regulation of toxic substances.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2122 (D.C. Cir.
June 8, 1976) (Flannery, J.), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In response, EPA set the standards
for all PCBs at the same level. Industry, however, objected that EPA could not extrapolate
from studies done on more chlorinated PCBs to establish the health effects of less chlorin-
ated PCBs. EPA insisted that the words of the statute allowed standards to err on the side
of over-protection and that absent adequate knowledge about less chlorinated PCBs, evi-
dence of risk from more chlorinated PCBs justified a general standard for all PCBs. The
court in Environmental Defense Fund held that under a substantial evidence test EPA had
sufficient data with which to make a decision and gave great deference to the expertise of
the agency in interpreting the information. "[EPA's] policy decisions are subject to deferen-
tial review, and its factual conclusions are upheld although they may not be supported by all
the evidence, or even by most of it." Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 12 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 1375.
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media quality into an effluent or emissions limitation for an indi-
vidual source. Difficulties often arise in relating a given discharge
to a particular level of health or environmental harm. Lacking ade-
quate risk assessment and dispersion models, the regulatory entity
must resort to highly speculative guesswork when it attempts to
set a standard, put a price on a discharge, or determine the appro-
priate number of saleable units. Although the regulator may cor-
rect mistakes by adjusting the standard, fee, or number of market-
able rights, a proper cure may take a long time. This difficulty is
not so debilitating in genetic technologies in which only a single
source for a hazardous agent exists in a relevant media quality
area.112 Still, the regulatory entity must devise a "reduction" model
to translate emissions into levels of media quality. This procedure
could be especially difficult for infective agents that do not degrade
but rather expand as they are carried from person to person. Regu-
lators must establish a media-quality standard for these agents at
such a level that infection of any individual would be impossible.
The media-quality approach is not especially useful for regu-
lating technologies that pose a low probability of catastrophic
harm for the same reasons that the incentive approach is inappro-
priate for these processes. The technology-based approach may be
more effective for regulating genetic technologies that pose cata-
strophic risks. Technologies currently exist for confining micro-or-
ganisms, their products, and by-products to reduce human and en-
vironmental exposure within the context of the fermentation
industry. Hence, a regulatory agency should not have too much
difficulty choosing from among the existing technologies and pre-
scribing an appropriate one. The most important considerations
probably will be the capacity of a particular technology to avoid
and contain accidents. In the context of the large-scale release of
genetically engineered micro-organisms, containment technologies
probably are not as well developed because the field is new and
rapidly changing. Prescribing technology-based standards for these
uses would be more difficult, and the agency likely would have to
rely more heavily upon prototype projects and technology
projections.
The technology-based approach also has disadvantages. The
most troublesome drawback is its inefficiency. A regulatory agency
112. To the extent that new biotechnologies produce conventional pollutants, such as
biological oxygen demand and particulate emissions, the waste streams from biotechnology
plants will intermingle with streams of other firms, and the agency must apportion the
available load among existing sources.
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has difficulty tailoring technology-based standards to individual
circumstances. A technology that works well in one plant may be
ineffective or excessively expensive in another plant. Even when
the regulatory agency allows variances from general standards for
individual circumstances, as usually happens, the technology-based
approach gives management little flexibility in designing the most
cost-effective solution to a technological problem. This situation is
especially disadvantageous in the context of a rapidly developing
technology such as genetic engineering in which production and
clean-up processes are not standardized and, hence, one plant's ex-
perience is not especially relevant to another plant's problems. In
these circumstances flexibility is especially important.
Another great disadvantage of technology-based standards is
their tendency to freeze technology at the levels of the prescribed
standards. Once a source has complied with a technology-based
standard, it has little incentive to install more protective technolo-
gies as they develop. Indeed, it has positive disincentive to develop
better technologies. Although technology-based standards can be
effective in bringing the laggards up to the performance level of
the exemplary plants in a given industry,"' the standards are un-
likely to inspire any major technological innovations. 1 4 This disad-
vantage is of limited significance for fermentation technologies be-
cause little innovation is necessary to achieve adequate
containment of potentially hazardous micro-organisms. " 5 The
drawback is much more relevant to large-scale release technologies
in which the containment problem has received little thought, and
innovation, therefore, is highly desirable.
The balancing approach avoids many of the disadvantages of
the technology-based theory. Since society can weigh benefits and
costs against each other, the balancing approach is more globally
efficient. Every regulation that meets a balancing test is cost-justi-
fied in that some health or environmental benefit justifies the cost
of the requirement. The balancing approach is less likely to freeze
technology because as new beneficial technologies become available
regulators can require new plants to include them and old facilities
to install them as the balancing equation indicates. The combina-
tion of a balancing approach and an incentive-based scheme can be
113. See generally La Pierre, Technology Forcing and Federal Environmental Protec-
tion Statutes, 62 IowA L. REv. 771 (1977) (technology-based standard provides no incentive
for industry to exceed minimum standard).
114. Id. at 825-26.
115. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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especially useful in achieving the optimal degree of technological
innovation. In theory, the overall balancing approach will ensure
that every firm pays its own way while the incentive approach en-
courages firms to develop breakthrough technologies that may shift
the overall balance toward further clean up by all regulated firms.
The balancing approach does not avoid the major disadvan-
tages of the media quality theory. Although a balancing approach
does not focus upon threshold levels, the regulatory entity must
estimate the effects of a toxic or infective agent at many different
exposures before assessing the benefits of installing a control tech-
nology. These estimates contain substantial uncertainties, and
good assessments require much expensive information gathering.116
A balancing approach also requires the agency to employ a reduc-
tion model to relate levels of media quality to individual dis-
charges. Similarly, a balancing approach is not easily adaptable to
low probability-high consequence risks associated with cata-
strophic accidents. For example, balancing a $100 safety expendi-
ture against a minute probability that 50,000 people will die in a
genetic engineering accident is extremely difficult. A further disad-
vantage of the balancing approach is the quantification dilemma
that arises from comparing costs of regulatory requirements to
benefits. A pure balancing approach would require a reduction in
both costs and benefits to the same units of value. The deci-
sionmaker thus would have to place a monetary value on environ-
mental amenities, various degrees of human illness, and human life
itself. Regulators may not be able to carry out this valuation pro-
cess straightforwardly and objectively. 117
The disadvantages of the balancing approach are all relevant
to the regulation of genetic technologies. Regulatory entities will
have difficulty estimating the value of the technologies themselves
to assess the impact of regulatory controls on technological devel-
opment. Similarly, any effort to quantify and place a monetary
value on the risks posed by the new technologies inevitably will
produce highly speculative estimates that are dependent upon un-
116. For a discussion of the complex problems and policy-dominated nature of quanti-
tative risk assessment, see OTA REPORT, supra note 16; Leape, supra note 82; McGarity,
supra note 10.
117. See COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 107; REFORMING REGULATION 105-23 (T.
Clark, M. Kosters, & J. Miller I, eds. 1980); McGarity, Media Quality, Technology and
Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, - LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. - (1983) (forthcoming); Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distribu-




derlying assumptions. At best, the process will yield a conclusion
about whether costs and benefits are in the same "ballpark." More
information about the potential risks and benefits of newly emerg-
ing technologies is necessary before regulatory decisionmakers can
use the balancing approach to ascertain whether to impose process
and end of pipe requirements upon the firms that utilize the
technologies.
3. The Addressee of the Regulatory Statement
Discussion of the appropriate techniques for health and envi-
ronmental regulation usually focuses on the sources of the harmful
substances. In general, society views the goal of a regulatory strat-
egy as the reduction in the amount of dangerous substance that
enters the environment or workplace. While most environmental
and health statutes do address sources of dangerous substances in
the environment, an alternative approach would be to subject the
receptors of the substances to regulatory scrutiny.
Professor Coase has suggested that the pollution problem is
equally a function of the receptor's sensitivities and the source's
noxiousness. 118 In the value-neutral analysis of the economist, pol-
lution is as much the "fault" of a stream's poor assimilative capac-
ity as it is the "fault" of the polluter's discharge of oxygen de-
manding substances. 19 In the occupational safety and health
context, employee illnesses due to toxic substances in the work-
place are both the workers' fault for breathing the substances and
the employer's fault for discharging the toxic materials. Therefore,
a regulation that would require employees to wear respirators or
other protective devices, .20 or that would force particularly suscep-
tible workers to leave the workplace,1 2 1 is as appropriate as a rule
118. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960).
119. Professor Coase illustrates his theory using Cooke v. Forbes, 5 L.R. Eq. 166
(1867). In Cooke a coconut fiber weaver brought a nuisance action against a manufacturer of
sulfate ammonia. The emissions from defendant's ammonia plant discolored plaintiff's
bleached mats. Defendant argued that plaintiff could avoid the problem if he used a differ-
ent bleaching process. Id. at 167.
120. In the past OSHA has articulated a policy of requiring engineering controls on
sources rather than respirators for employers. Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed.
Reg. 5918, 5952 (1978). OSHA, however, occasionally has prescribed respirators as an in-
terim control. Id. at 5953. Employers strongly urge the adoption of respirators, which are
normally much cheaper, albeit less comfortable, than desigri and engineering controls. Id. at
5952. Major controversy, however, exists over the efficiency of respirators in protecting
workers. Occupational Exposure to Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,952, 52,990 (1978).
121. See McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 Tax. L.
REv. 999, 1065 (1981).
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which would force the manufacturer to reduce the emissions level
of toxic substances. Manufacturers of potentially dangerous con-
sumer products such as drugs use the common receptor-oriented
technique of a simple warning.
Source-oriented techniques usually are preferable to receptor-
oriented approaches because their goal is to eliminate health and
environmental hazards. 122 Sometimes, however, receptor-oriented
techniques can achieve the same risk reductions as source-oriented
methods at considerably lower costs. 123 For example, surgical
masks, respirators, and good hygiene can be extremely effective
methods of reducing the risks that infective organisms pose in fer-
mentation technologies. Employees may object to the inconve-
nience of receptor-oriented requirements, but their complaints are
unpersuasive given that infected employees themselves are sources
for further spread of infective diseases. Thus, receptor-oriented hy-
giene requirements are really secondary source-oriented require-
ments. A company may combine receptor-oriented techniques with
source-oriented requirements, such as directional air flows and air
filtration, to produce an optimal degree of safety.
Public attention recently has focused on a receptor-oriented
technique that supporters have dubbed the "worker right to
know.' 11 24 The concept is simple but its implementation has proved
difficult. Advocates of worker right to know regulations contend
that employees could avoid many injuries caused by chemical sub-
stances in the workplace if they knew the chemical names and
hazards of the materials with which they have contact.1 25 Scientific
literature has reported extensively on the effects of many toxic
substances, but this information often is useless to employees in
122. While source-oriented techniques can remove health and environmental hazards
from one medium, these techniques may cause the introduction of new hazards into a differ-
ent medium. Sewage treatment plants, for example, clean up discharged water but create
large quantities of sludge, which may contain dangerous concentrations of heavy metals,
such as cadmium. Similarly, scrubbers installed in smokestacks remove sulfur oxides from
the air but create large amounts of potentially toxic solid waste. See Kneese, Pollution and
a Better Environment, 10 Amz. L. REv. 10, 11-16 (1968).
123. "The Council on Wage and Price stability and some industry representatives sug-
gested a control strategy which would permit employers to place principal reliance on re-
spiratory protection where employers determined that it was a 'less costly method of achiev-
ing the same level of worker health.'" Occupational Exposure to Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,952,
52,990 (1978).
124. Conry, The Right to Know: Not to be Denied, Environmental Regulation Analyst
9 (1982); Grozuczak, Poisons on the Job: The Reagan Administration and American Work-
ers, in SIERRA CLUB NATURAL HERITAGE REPORT No. 4 (October 1982).
125. Conry, supra note 124, at 9.
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evaluating the hazards of products in the workplace. While scien-
tists refer to hazards and toxic effects by the scientific name of the
substance, products in the workplace are identified by thousands
of trade and code names. Hence, workers may be ignorant of the
potentially life-threatening exposures that they face.
Worker right to know advocates demand a free flow of infor-
mation between the government, industry scientists, and work-
ers. 126 Supporters maintain that this exchange of information is
critical to the "voluntary" and "cooperative" approach to occupa-
tional safety and health that is currently popular among regula-
tors. Some advocates would extend this concept to a "community
right to know" in which industry with the assistance of govern-
ment would inform the public of the identities and risks of chemi-
cal substances to which the public might suffer exposure.127
Receptor-oriented regulatory techniques are likely to prove
less useful in genetic technologies involving large-scale releases.
Once an organism or its by-products enter the environment, a re-
ceptor-oriented technology capable of reducing health and environ-
mental risks becomes much more difficult to devise. Moreover, a
receptor-oriented approach probably will encounter far greater re-
sistance from citizens who expect a reasonably clean and healthy
environment and question the right of any firm to "blame the vic-
tim" by insisting that receptors take steps to avoid risks.
4. The Focus of the Regulatory Statement
A final distinction that may aid a policymaker in choosing
among various health and environmental regulatory techniques
concerns the difference between addressing regulatees as individu-
als and addressing them as members of a larger class.128 In a per-
fect regulatory world every regulatee would be addressed on its
own merits. For example, a regulator would promulgate media
quality-based standards for very small airsheds, short segments of
rivers, and individual workplaces, rather than for all airsheds, wa-
126. Grozuczak, supra note 124, at 21-24.
127. Conry, supra note 124, at 10-11.
128. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex, Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MicH. L. REV. 111, 115-16 (1972);
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudi-
cation and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 521-22 (1970). Al-
though the distinction between generic and individual is relevant in an incentive-based ap-
proach to health and environmental regulation (investment-inducing charges could be
calculable individually or generically), it is more commonly applicable to a command ap-
proach. See Boyer, supra, at 133.
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tersheds, and workplaces in the nation. Similarly, technology-
based standards would reflect a detailed examination of all idio-
syncratic economic and technological aspects of each production
process and regulatee. Unfortunately, in the real world these de-
tailed examinations are extremely costly and in some cases impos-
sible to perform. If the regulatory entity is to function at all, it
must have the power to impose some generic regulations. Regula-
tory alternatives lie on a continuum between across the board stan-
dards and individualized permits. Generic standards generally are
more intrusive than individual permits because they are less effi-
cient and provide for less flexibility in the regulatory process. The
legislature determines its location along the spectrum by balancing
considerations of efficiency and administrative flexibility." 9
The generic approach may be more appropriate for regulating
the use of genetically engineered micro-organisms in fermentation
technologies. Since several generic processes exist that reduce the
risks posed by those technologies, broad technology-based require-
ments probably could address the risks of most hosts in almost
every firm. The agency, however, might decide to be more individ-
ualistic and promulgate separate containment standards for each
variety of micro-organism. The agency could individualize still fur-
ther and set the requirements for every process that yields a sepa-
rate product. Some processes undoubtedly are riskier than others.
The crucial question, for which no satisfactory answer currently
exists, is the extent to which these differences are likely to justify
the added administrative costs of establishing individual
standards.
In large-scale application of genetically engineered micro-orga-
nisms, scientific experience is insufficient to establish generic re-
quirements. Hence, the best approach is probably a case by case
permit requirement in which the relevant agency assesses technol-
ogies, predicts health and environmental effects, or balances these
two elements against each other in individual permit proceedings.
129. Another consideration that often enters the decision whether to use a generic or
individual approach concerns intergovernmental comity. While a single national entity can
promulgate, implement, and enforce generic requirements, administrative infeasibility often
precludes national administration of an individual approach. State and local entities, there-
fore, must participate in implementing and administering federal permitting programs. See,
e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. V 1981). Thus, a policymaker's
choice between generic and individual approaches may depend upon the trust that it has for




Since the current information on the risks of newly emerging
genetic technologies is insufficient to determine with any accept-
able degree of confidence whether the government should impose
regulatory controls, any suggestion of a particular regulatory re-
gime would be extremely speculative. The preceding discussion has
attempted to set out a wide range of options for policymakers if
regulation becomes necessary. The discussion is also useful in de-
ciding whether existing schemes will provide a sufficient framework
for genetic technology regulation or whether the government will
have to devise a new plan.
In formulating an appropriate regulatory strategy for the new
genetic technologies, regulators should begin by distinguishing be-
tween the use of genetically engineered micro-organisms in tradi-
tional fermentation technologies and in large-scale applications.
Using micro-organisms in fermentation is not at all unique. Tech-
nologies exist that are capable of isolating the organisms so that no
human or environmental exposure will result. Furthermore, scien-
tists can contain micro-organism products and by-products
through the application of well-established technologies. Given
that containment of most risks posed by fermentation technologies
is possible and that these risks are likely to be low probability/high
consequence risks,"'0 technology-based commands probably are
most appropriate. The incentive approach is less adaptable to a
technology-based scheme, and the continuous monitoring neces-
sary to enforce an incentive plan would entail great cost for very
little benefit.131 Technologies that are oriented toward protecting
health and the environment are very similar to the technologies
130. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Although the use of genetically engi-
neered micro-organisms in traditional fermentation technologies is different from the large-
scale application of genetic technology, both uses present low probability/high consequence
risks. In the fermentation setting the probability of an explosion and escape of an infectious
organism is low, but if it were to occur, the results could be devastating. In large-scale appli-
cation, the concern is that released micro-organisms could evolve into infectious and deadly
organisms. Scientists assume that the probability that a benign organism could evolve into a
deadly entity in the environment is low.
131. An incentive-based scheme for a fermentation facility presumably would rely
upon escapes of micro-organisms, their products, or by-products as the incentive rather than
upon human deaths or injuries. Hence, continuous monitoring of the surroundings of the
fermentator would be necessary. Since existing technology, according to industry witnesses,
is capable of reducing escapes to a rare event, most of the resources expended on monitoring
would be wasted. A technology-based scheme using a command approach would require pe-
riodic monitoring to ensure that the technology was operating correctly, but this option
probably would be less expensive than continuous monitoring.
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appropriate for efficient production."' 2 If efforts to attain these
goals continue to coincide, little need exists for balancing health
and environmental considerations against economic and technolog-
ical feasibility in prescribing technology-based requirements. If,
however, health and environmental technologies become more ex-
pensive than normal construction and operation costs, policymak-
ers may want to gravitate toward a balancing approach.
The question whether regulators should apply technology-
based commands generically or individually is difficult to answer.
The commonplace nature of fermentation controls indicates that
they should be generic, but the novel nature of genetic technology
and the tenuous financial status of many new genetic engineering
firms weigh in favor of an individualistic approach. The appropri-
ate regulatory agency, rather than the legislative body, probably
should resolve the issue.
A policymaker should retain authority to impose both source-
oriented and receptor-oriented requirements for fermentation
technologies. Existing source technologies seem reasonably effec-
tive for containing the current generation of fermentation micro-
organisms, products, and by-products. Future research and devel-
opment efforts, however, may result in the creation of more dan-
gerous processes. Without receptor-oriented controls, scientists
may not discover these risks until actual harm results. Receptor-
oriented controls, such as respirators and hygiene requirements,
can provide a margin of safety by helping to ensure worker protec-
tion even if harmful agents escape from containment facilities.
A different regulatory strategy may be appropriate for tech-
nologies that require large-scale release of genetically engineered
micro-organisms. Since the risks of large-scale applications are
likely to be low probability/high consequence risks, technology-
based commands would be most suitable. This approach is prefera-
ble given the difficulty that a regulatory agency which applied a
media quality-based theory would have in identifying unsafe levels
of health or environmental harm caused by large-scale release of
micro-organisms. Moreover, the current primitive state of large-
scale release technologies makes it extremely difficult to identify or
predict the cause and effect relationships upon which to base indi-
vidual source controls under the media quality approach. The reg-
ulatory entity initially should prescribe general technology-based
requirements as the production technologies themselves evolve.
132. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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Because protective technologies will not likely correspond to pro-
duction technologies and will make a production process more ex-
pensive without adding to the "productivity" of the enterprise,
regulators may want to apply a broad balancing approach.
As with fermentation technologies, an agency will have diffi-
culty identifying a meterable unit of health or environmental harm
to implement an incentive approach. On the other hand, since the
production technology is so new and scientists have not yet devel-
oped controls for many processes, freezing control technologies
through technology-based commands probably would be unwise.
Any predictions about the adaptability of the incentive approach
to large-scale release production technologies would be highly un-
reliable without more information about individual technologies.
Perhaps the best strategy is to give the regulatory entity the au-
thority to choose either the incentive or command approaches on a
case by case basis, at least until clearer identification of the risks
and further evolution of production and control technologies occur.
Alternatively, policymakers may decide simply to prohibit large-
scale release technologies case by case pending a more thorough
study of the risks.
The foregoing analysis suggests that an individual approach is
more suitable to large-scale release technologies. Indeed, the novel
nature of many genetic technologies makes them ideal subjects for
a permit system that gives the regulator and regulatee an opportu-
nity to explore the risks that a technology might pose and to ex-
amine options for ensuring public safety. The major drawback to a
permitting system concerns the political infeasibility of giving a
single agency veto authority over a potentially wide range of pro-
duction technologies, ranging from mining to farming. As this Arti-
cle discussed previously,'"3 the regulation of large-scale release pro-
duction technologies is particularly unsuited to the receptor-
oriented approach. For practical and political reasons manufactur-
ers must direct whatever controls they place upon the interaction
between the production technologies and the entities affected by
those technologies toward the technologies themselves.
IV. CURRENTLY EXISTING REGULATORY REGIMES
After discussing the possible hazards of the new genetic tech-
nologies and the possible elements of an adequate regulatory
scheme, an analysis of how policymakers could apply existing regu-
133. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
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latory regimes to the emerging technologies is appropriate. Part IV
examines these regimes and addresses the question whether new
rules and statutes are necessary to ensure human safety and envi-
ronmental protection in the genetic engineering industry. Several
sources of regulatory authority exist for addressing biotechnolo-
gies. The first section of part IV describes broadly the relevant
statutes and administrative regulations that may be applicable to
the risks posed by genetic technologies. The remainder of part IV
measures particular statutory and regulatory provisions against the
options suggested in part III.
A. Sources of Regulating Authority
1. The National Institute of Health Guidelines
Following a vigorous public debate on the risks and benefits of
conducting laboratory research with rDNA, NIH issued its "Guide-
lines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules" on
July 1, 1976.134 Although NIH has amended them several times,13 5
the guidelines nevertheless, have received broad support and have
served as a model for regulators throughout the world.138 In the
United States the guidelines are binding on all research conducted
by federal agencies or sponsored by grants from federal agencies. s3
The guidelines require the establishment of Institutional Biosafety
Committees, detail the responsibilities of these committees, catego-
rize rDNA research, and prescribe varying levels of biological and
physical containment for certain experiments.138
The NIH Guidelines address one type of genetic engineer-
134. NIH Guidelines, supra note 7, at 27,902.
135. See supra note 7.
136. Other countries have similiar regulations for rDNA research, although foreign
standards historically have been less detailed and less stringent than NIH Guidelines. For
excellent descriptions of the evolution of rDNA research regulation in countries other than
the United States, see Henderson, Japanese Regulation of Recombinant DNA Activities, 12
U. TOL. L. REy. 891 (1981); Tooze, International and European Regulation of Recombinant
DNA Research, 12 U. TOL. L. Rav. 869 (1981).
137. Technically, the NIH Guidelines are binding only upon research sponsored by
NIH. NIH Guidelines-1981, supra note 7, § IV-B, at 34,475. Virtually all other federal
agencies, however, have agreed to make the NIH Guidelines binding on research that they
support. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 320, 327 (1977) (testi-
mony of Dr. Donald B. Fredrickson, director, NIH).
138. See NIH Guidelines, supra note 7. Interestingly, the most recent version of the
NIH Guidelines exempts research conducted with E. coli K12, the bacteria that probably
will be the predominant organism used in early industrial applications of rDNA technolo-
gies. NIH Guidelines-1981, supra note 7, app., at 34,485.
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ing-rDNA experimentation. They apply primarily to research us-
ing rDNA molecules and not to practical applications of rDNA
technologies. The guidelines prohibit large-scale experiments that
require more than ten liters of rDNA culture unless the researcher
can show to the satisfaction of the director of NIH that the re-
searcher has rigorously characterized the rDNA molecules used in
the experiment and that no harmful sequences exist.139
This prohibition on large-scale experimentation could consti-
tute a significant impediment to industrial use of rDNA technolo-
gies. The NIH Guidelines, however, are not binding on private en-
tities that do not receive federal funding for rDNA research. The
only sanction that NIH can impose upon a laboratory that violates
the guidelines is the termination of NIH funding. Clearly, the only
arguably relevant requirement for large-scale projects using rDNA
technologies is not binding upon the corporate entities that are
likely to be developing these projects. Although many corporations
in the United States have agreed voluntarily to abide by the NIH
Guidelines,140 they have declined to adhere to the prohibition on
large-scale use of rDNA organisms.
Recognizing the limitations of its regulatory authority, NIH in
1980 promulgated "Physical Containment Recommendations for
Large-Scale Uses of Organisms Containing Recombinant DNA
Molecules. 1 4' These recommendations merely serve as a guide to
private laboratories embarking on large-scale rDNA experimenta-
tion. Like the NIH Guidelines, the recommendations attempt to
categorize large-scale projects according to levels of expected risk.
The recommendations prescribe three increasingly stringent levels
of physical containment for large-scale projects. In addition, the
NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee offers to consult
with companies attempting large-scale efforts and to review sug-
gested safety precautions.1 42 None of the NIH requirements is le-
gally binding upon private companies that use large-scale applica-
tions of rDNA technologies, and these firms are free to ignore the
139. NIH Guidelines-1981, supra note 7, § 1-06, at 34,463.
140. See, e.g., Hearings on Science Policy Implications of DNA Recombinant Mole-
cule Research Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91,374 (1977) (testimony of Dr.
Ronald E. Cape, president, Cetus Corporation and testimony of John G. Adams, vice presi-
dent for scientific and professional relations, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association).
Private companies in Japan and Europe also have cooperated voluntarily with their coun-
tries' guidelines. See Henderson, supra note 136, at 897; Tooze, supra note 136, at 879-80.




guidelines and recommendations. Although the guidelines alone
are not adequate to regulate any aspect of large-scale industrial
biotechnology, the recommendations provide a convenient model
for a regulatory entity with the authority to promulgate rules bind-
ing on experimentation. The remainder of part IV limits discussion
of the guidelines and recommendations to their use in this
capacity.
2. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
In enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHAct) 14 3 Congress intended to "assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the [United States] safe and healthful
working conditions . . " " The statute created the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) within the Department
of Labor to establish and enforce occupational safety and health
standards, 5 and an independent Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRev) to adjudicate alleged violations of
OSHA standards and of the statute's general duty clause. 146 The
OSHAct also created a National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) in the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to gather data, assess risks, and recommend occu-
pational safety and health standards to OSHA. 147 The Act thus es-
tablishes a comprehensive scheme for protecting employees from
workplace hazards.
3. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act, and the Public Health Service
Act 1
48
FDA administers several statutes that could serve to regulate ge-
143. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
144. Id. § 651.
145. See id. § 653.
146. See id. § 661.
147. See id. § 671.
148. This section focuses primarily on Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regula-
tion of the microbiological production of pharmaceuticals. Although some questions unique
to food and cosmetics will not be answered, drugs are likely to be the first commercially
significant products of the new technologies and thus raise the immediately important regu-
latory issues. The discussion extensively draws upon the work of Dr. Edward L. Korwek.
See, e.g., Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Authority
of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 633 (1980),
reprinted with modifications in 21 JURIMETRIcs 264 (1981); Korwek & Trinker, Perspectives
on the FDA Status of Drug Products Manufactured by the Recombinant DNA Technique,
36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 517 (1981).
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netic technologies, such as the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FFDCA), 49 the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA),150
and sections of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).15' The pri-
mary purpose of these laws is to ensure that food is safe, pure, and
wholesome; that human and animal drugs, and biological products,
and therapeutic devices are safe and effective; and that all these
products have honest labels.
For administrative convenience in achieving its goals, FDA has
structured itself along product lines. Separate bureaus have re-
sponsibility for all regulatory activities regarding specific classes of
products-for example, foods, drugs, and biological and medical
devices. Although different products necessarily require different
regulatory approaches, each bureau addresses many issues common
to all products. The FFDCA prohibits distribution or importation
of adulterated or misbranded articles. The term "adulterated" re-
fers to products that are defective, unsafe, filthy, or were produced
under unsanitary conditions.152 The word "misbranded" pertains
to statements, designs, or pictures in labeling that are false or mis-
leading and to the failure to provide required information on la-
bels.153 The statute also prohibits distribution of any article that
requires but has not received FDA approval.
5 4
FDA must approve certain products for safety before their
sale or use. For example, manufacturers must submit samples of
production batches of antibiotics and insulin to FDA laboratories
for testing. The agency then certifies the purity, potency, and
safety of these products before it permits their shipment. 55 Simi-
larly, the agency must approve new drugs and certain devices for
safety and effectiveness. 56 Premarket controls also apply to biolog-
ical products, such as serums or vaccines. 157 Pesticide residues in
food commodities must not exceed safe tolerances that EPA estab-
lishes and FDA enforces. 58 FDA bases all premarketing clearances
on scientific data that manufacturers provide. The information is
subject to review and acceptance by FDA scientists for scope and
149. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
150. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 262-263 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
152. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 351, 361 (1976).
153. Id. §§ 342, 352, 362.
154. Id. § 331a.
155. Id. §§ 356, 357.
156. Id. § 360e.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1976).
158. 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1976).
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adequacy. Owners or operators of all establishments manufacturing
or processing drugs and devices must register their facilities and
products with FDA.159
In addition to its product licensing power under the FFDCA,
FDA has broad authority under section 361 of the PHSA16 ° to pro-
mulgate regulations in cooperation with the Center for Disease
Control "to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of
communicable diseases." The Surgeon General of the Public
Health Service may provide for "inspection, fumigation, disinfec-
tion, sanitation . . . and other measures" to carry out these
rules.""1
4. The Toxic Substances Control Act
Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 6 1
in 1976 to provide a comprehensive mechanism for gathering data
on the health and environmental effects of chemical substances,16 3
for assessing the risks of these substances,1 " and for ensuring that
the manufacture, distribution, use, and disposal of toxic materials
does not pose unreasonable risks to man and the environment.1 6 5
Congress charged the EPA with administering and enforcing the
statute. 66 To date, EPA's implementation efforts have been slow
and halting and recent budgetary cuts ensure that the TSCA will
remain a relatively ineffective regulatory tool. Nevertheless, the
statute is a large repository of regulatory power that EPA may
draw upon when necessary.
The TSCA regulates only chemical substances16 7 and mix-
tures." 8 While the TSCA clearly is an appropriate vehicle for regu-
159. Id. § 360.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1976).
161. Id. § 264a.
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
163. Id. § 2601(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
164. Id. 9 2601(b)(2).
165. Id. 9 2601(b)(3).
166. Id. 9 2602(1).
167. Id. § 2602(2)(A). Section 3(2) of the TSCA defines the term "chemical substance"
broadly to include "any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity,
including.., any combination of such substances occurring in nature, and.., any uncom-
bined radical." Id. The definition explicitly excludes mixtures, pesticides, tobacco, food,
food additives, drugs and cosmetics, source material, special nuclear material, and by-prod-
uct material. Id. § 2602(2)(B).
168. The statute defines a mixture broadly to include "any combination of two or
more chemical substances if the combination does not occur in nature and is not, in whole
or in part, the result of a chemical reaction." Id. § 2602(8).
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lating chemical products and by-products of genetic engineering
technologies, whether EPA can invoke the statute to protect the
public against risks that the micro-organisms themselves create de-
pends upon whether the organisms come within the broad defini-
tion of chemical substance. Although an entire micro-organism
probably is not a chemical substance, the DNA molecule within a
genetically engineered micro-organism would seem to fit the statu-
tory definition of chemical substance. The molecule has a particu-
lar molecular identity even though that identity is not always as-
certainable. Indeed, the presence of DNA within the micro-
organism allows the "microbial factory" to be industrially useful.169
Even if the combination of genes does not "occur in nature," the
DNA might come within the definition of mixture. Clearly, this
question is ripe for litigation if EPA decides to regulate the DNA
of genetically engineered industrial micro-organisms. If the courts
refuse to find that the DNA within a micro-organism is a chemical
substance or a mixture, then the TSCA will be unavailable to regu-
late the industrial use of genetic technologies.
5. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Conceivably, researchers might use rDNA technologies to cre-
ate organisms, such as insect or plant pathogens, for use as pesti-
cides. If scientists developed rDNA-based pesticides, the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)170 would be
another source of authority for regulating some genetic engineer-
ing. The statute provides that no pesticide may be sold, distrib-
uted, or used within the United States unless it is registered with
EPA.17 1 The FIFRA defines the word "pesticide" very broadly to
include "any substance or mixture of substances intended for
169. The author uses the term "microbial factory" to analogize the production capac-
ity of micro-organisms to the production capacity of a traditional industrial factory. See
supra part II.
170. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
171. Id. § 136a. An applicant for registration must demonstrate that:
(A) its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it;
(B) its labeling and other material required to be submitted to comply with the re-
quirements of [the Act];
(C) it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment; and
(D) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice it will
not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
Id. § 136a(c)(5). The applicant must make these showings using scientific studies that it has
performed on the efficacy and safety of the pesticide.
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preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest."' 2 EPA
has promulgated extensive registration guidelines that describe the
kinds of studies it will accept to show that a pesticide is safe and
effective. 7  The guidelines, however, do not apply to biological
pesticides, which EPA regulates case by case.
174
6. The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and Other Federal
Statutes
a. The Clean Air Act
If the industrial process that uses genetic technologies causes
the release into the atmosphere of "criteria" pollutants or cur-
rently listed hazardous air pollutants, the firm must comply with
Parts A, C, and D of Title I of the Clean Air Act.175 In the normal
operation of a fermentation plant or large-scale release process the
chances are remote that significant emissions of current criteria or
hazardous pollutants will result unless a laboratory decides to dry
liquid wastes and incinerate them. 76 Furthermore, organisms con-
taining rDNA molecules probably will not qualify as new criteria
pollutants because plants will not release them from "numerous or
diverse mobile or stationary sources"-a necessary precondition.
77
Therefore, before these organisms can be subject to regulation
under the Clean Air Act, EPA must list them as hazardous
pollutants.'
b. The Clean Water Act
Under sections 301, 304, and 306 of the Clean Water Act,1
7 9
EPA may promulgate technology-based effluent limitations and
guidelines for categories and subcategories of new and existing dis-
172. Id. § 136(u).
173. See 40 C.F.R. § 162.5 (1982).
174. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,696 (1978).
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7508, 7521-7574, 7601-7626 (Supp. V 1981). The currently
listed criteria pollutants are sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, hy-
drocarbons, nitrogen dioxide, and lead. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1982). The currently listed hazardous
air pollutants are asbestos, beryllium, mercury, and vinyl chloride. 40 C.F.R. § 61 (1982).
176. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT Docu-
MENT FOR INTERIM FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES AND PROPOSED NEW SOURCE
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING POINT SOURCE CATE-
GORY 91-94 (1976).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
178. Id. § 7412.
179. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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chargers of "conventional pollutants" 80 into the navigable waters
of the United States.'8 ' Effluent limitations and guidelines for vari-
ous categories and subcategories of industries specify the "best
practical control technology" for these conventional pollutants,
and future limitations and guidelines will specify the "best conven-
tional control technology."'81 2 If a source does not belong to a cate-
gory for which EPA has promulgated effluent limitations and
guidelines, that source still must obtain a National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under section 402.113
c. The Solid Waste Disposal Act, the Resources Conservation
and Recovery Act, and the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act
EPA may regulate the disposal of solid wastes that genetic
technologies generate under the same statutory authority that per-
mits the agency to regulate disposal of solid waste from any labora-
tory or manufacturing process. Like the Clean Air and the Clean
Water Acts, the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), T as amended
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), 85 focuses more directly upon the pollutants than on the
processes that generated them. The RCRA amendments to the
SWDA considerably have advanced federal involvement in the reg-
ulation of solid waste disposal and management, particularly in the
area of hazardous waste management. Despite these substantial
advances, however, federal regulation of solid waste falls short of
the federal government's participation in air and water pollution
control.
Although the disposal of solid wastes into the ocean hitherto
has posed only a minor environmental problem, in 1972 Congress
enacted the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, commonly known as the "Federal Ocean Dumping Act." '
180. Conventional pollutants include biological oxygen demand (BOD), pH, fecal
coliform, and suspended solids. Id. § 1314(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
181. The statute defines the term "navigable waters" broadly to include every stream
in the United States. Id. § 1362 (1976). See United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
182. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). EPA will prescribe the best
conventional control technology case by case during the permitting process. Id.
183. Id. § 1342.
184. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3259 (1976).
185. Id. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
186. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976). Congress also enacted the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments in 1972. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1265 (1976).
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Congress subsequently amended the Act in 1974 to make the law
conform with United States treaty responsibilities under the Con-
vention of the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter. 187 Although the prohibition against
ocean dumping pertains primarily to international protection of
the waters of the sea, the dumping issue is also relevant to domes-
tic waste disposal."88 The purpose of the statute is to regulate the
ocean dumping of materials transported from the United States
and of materials transported from outside the United States if the
dumping occurs in ocean waters over which the United States has
jurisdiction or may exercise control.18 9
The foregoing survey of relevant statutes reveals that at least
three agencies possess overlapping regulatory authority. Clearly,
each statute gives its agency limited power over certain aspects of
a complete technology. The food and drug and pesticides statutes
focus primarily on end products. The air, water, and waste disposal
statutes address unwanted by-products. The OSHAct is aimed at
the manufacturing process. Only the TSCA adopts a holistic ap-
proach to a given technology, provided the technology results in
the production or use of a chemical substance. Measuring the pre-
viously identified options for an adequate regulatory regime
against the existing statutes will reveal which options current law
will authorize and which areas may require interagency coopera-
tion or new statutory authority.
B. Data Collecting and Monitoring
1. A Central Registry
This Article has concluded that a data collecting and monitor-
ing system is a prerequisite to an adequate regulatory scheme and,
187. Id. §§ 1283, 1285, 1371, 1375. See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No.
8165.
188. Ocean dumping generally refers to dumping on the open sea. The Federal Ocean
Dumping Act prohibits dumping of
matter of any kind or description, including, but not limited to, dredged material, solid
waste, incinerator residue, garbage, sewage, sewage sludge, munitions, radiological,
chemical and biological warfare agents, radioactive materials, chemicals, biological
and laboratory waste, wreck [sic] or discarded equipment; rock, sand, excavation deb-
ris, and industrial, municipal, agricultural, and other waste.
Id. § 1402(c) (emphasis added). The statute parallels closely the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act in its approach and in its reliance on a permit system.
189. Id. § 1401(c).
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indeed, is crucial to a decision whether to regulate at all.'9 ° One
useful element of a data collection and monitoring system would
be a central registry of hosts, vectors, industrially useful genetic
sequences, products, and by-products. 91 The TSCA arguably gives
EPA authority to require firms using genetically engineered micro-
organisms to submit information necessary to compile an adequate
registry, provided the organism's DNA is a chemical substance. 19
Under section 5 of the TSCA 93 the manufacturer of a new chemi-
cal substance must submit to EPA a notice of its intention to man-
ufacture or process the substance."
Section 5 thus appears to give EPA sufficient authority to re-
quire companies to notify the agency of any new chemical products
or by-products that result from fermentation or other large-scale
use of genetically engineered micro-organisms. This section does
not necessarily give EPA power to require companies to disclose
what solvents or other existing chemicals they use in the fermenta-
tion extraction process. 95 Nor does section 5 appear to permit the
agency to force companies to give it premanufacture notification of
hosts and vectors because these materials generally would not meet
the definitions of chemical substance or mixture. 196 On the other
hand, since DNA may be a chemical substance or mixture, section
5 may give EPA authority to require that companies notify the
agency of the identity of the genetically manipulated DNA that is
within the host cell.
The information that EPA could generate under section 5
probably would be sufficient for a comprehensive registry of new
products, by-products, hosts, and vectors. The data bank would
190. See supra part III(A).
191. The Interagency Committee on Recombinant DNA Research, chaired by Dr.
Donald Fredrickson, director of the National Institutes of Health, reached a consensus that
registration was an "important element of regulation" and should occur before the use or
production of rDNA molecules. See 2 NIH DOCUMENT, supra note 36, at 268.
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2602(2), 2602(9), 2605, 2607(b)(1) (1976).
193. Id. § 2604.
194. The statute defines the term "manufacture" circularly as "to import . . . pro-
duce, or manufacture." Id. § 2602(7). Notice must include the following: (1) Name, chemical
identity and chemical structure; (2) categories or proposed categories of use; (3) estimates of
total amounts to be manufactured, processed or used; (4) description of byproducts; (5)
existing health and safety data; (6) estimates of the number of people who will be exposed
to the substance; and (7) manner of disposal. Id. § 2604(d).
195. EPA's inventory of existing chemical substances, however, should list these chem-
icals. See id. § 2607(b).
196. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. Arguably, a small viral or plas-
mid vector would be a chemical substance within the meaning of section 3(2) of the TSCA,
15 U.S.C. § 2602(2) (1976).
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grow automatically as firms developed new products, hosts, and
vectors. The broad reading of section 5 that this Article suggests
may impose an excessive burden on biotechnology companies. Sec-
tion 5(h)(4), however, allows EPA to exempt the manufacture of
any new chemical substance from all or part of the section 5 re-
quirements if EPA determines that the manufacture, processing,
distribution, use, or disposal of the chemical will not present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.19 In ad-
dition, section 5(h)(5) permits the agency to exempt from section 5
notification and test data submission requirements "any chemical
substance (A) which exists temporarily as a result of a chemical
reaction in the manufacturing or processing of a mixture or an-
other chemical substance, and (B) to which there is no, and will
not be, human or environmental exposure.' 1 98 Section 5(h)(5) ap-
parently would apply to the DNA that is within organisms used in
the fermentation process if the organisms are destroyed when the
fermentation is complete. Moreover, EPA may grant exemptions
under section 5(h)(4) for fermentation processes and certain unen-
closed technologies that the agency determines are free of unrea-
sonable risks. The exemption provisions may be one way for the
agency to handle the expected flood of premanufacture notification
filings that otherwise will result as manufacturers begin to "fine
tune" organisms to achieve maximum output.
Section 5 of the TSCA thus appears to provide EPA with a
flexible authority to compile an adequate registry of products, by-
products, and sequences. The agency probably does not have the
power to require firms to report hosts and vectors per se, but it
may be able to require the reporting of sequences, which will con-
vey essentially the same information. Although few host-vector
systems currently exist, as the number increases, EPA's inability to
require entities to report hosts and vectors may become a signifi-
cant informational impediment.
Like most regulatory statutes, the TSCA provides that the
agency may not disclose trade secret information that is otherwise
exempt from disclosure under subsection 552(b)(4) of the Freedom
of Information Act.199 This prohibition almost surely would include
197. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(4) (1976). EPA recently has exempted certain chemicals used
in enclosed photographic processes. See 40 C.F.R. § 710.4(d)(5) (1982).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(5) (1976).
199. Id. § 2613(a). The contents of health and safety studies, however, do not fall
within the definition of trade secret so long as the agency does not disclose "processes used
in the manufacturing or processing of a chemical substance or mixture or, in the case of a
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the identity of products, by-products, hosts, and vectors; hence the
public could not inspect the registry."' ° To avoid total nondisclo-
sure of newly developed chemical products, the TSCA requires
that EPA provide the public with at least a generic description of
new chemicals as entities report them to the agency. 0' The agency
could attempt to implement a similar disclosure scheme for the
products and by-products of a biotechnology.
FDA has significant authority under the FFDCA to require a
report of products, by-products, hosts, vectors, and technologies
used to manufacture drugs.2 0 ' FDA can require firms to give the
agency this information at the time of a new drug application. In
addition, the agency can require companies to report significant as-
pects of manufacturing technologies during early developmental
stages as a condition to later new drug approval.20 3 The FIFRA
gives EPA similar authority to require reporting of processes used
to manufacture pesticides. 204 The government could use both au-
thorities to compile limited registries of products, by-products,
hosts, and vectors used in the production of pesticides and of prod-
ucts subject to FDA's licensing authority. At present, however,
neither agency has indicated whether it intends to devote any spe-
cial attention to biotechnologies that use genetically engineered
micro-organisms.205
mixture,. . . the portion of the mixture comprised by any of the chemical substances in the
mixture." Id. § 2613(b).
200. The agency, however, must disclose information on the identity of products and
by-products if the information is in a health and safety study. Id. Since health and safety
studies generally are not complete until long after development and marketing of the chemi-
cals, this provision will not be useful in compelling public disclosure of the registry.
201. Id. § 2604(d)(2).
202. 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1976).
203. FDA uses its product licensing authority to require companies to comply with its
rules on human experimentation during clinical trials for drugs. See 21 C.F.R. ]§ 58.]1-
58.219 (1982); id. § 312.1(a); cf. Protection of Human Subjects: Standards for Institutional
Review Boards for Clinical Investigations, 46 Fed. Reg. 8958 (1981).
204. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
205. See infra text accompanying notes 223-24. FDA has acknowledged that although
it has not worked out the details for assuring compliance with the NIH Guidelines, it is
considering a registration requirement for all rDNA research conducted for submission to
FDA. 43 Fed. Reg. 60, 134 (1978). In evaluating this research FDA would utilize the exper-
tise of NIH as necessary and might refer specific applications to NIH to determine their
compliance with the NIH Guidelines. Id.
EPA recently has requested that the Administrator's Toxic Substances Advisory Com-
mittee examine the possibility of regulating the newly emerging biotechnologies under the
TSCA and other environmental laws. See EPA Official Asks Committee to Examine




Clearly, neither the FFDCA nor the FIFRA gives regulatory
agencies adequate authority to compile a central registry of all ge-
netically engineered hosts and vectors and their by-products. The
TSCA grants the only comprehensive authority to perform this
function. Hence, EPA must take the lead and address biotechnolo-
gies by promulgating regulations pursuant to section 5 of the
TSCA. Once biotechnology firms are on notice that EPA considers
the DNA in genetically altered micro-organisms to be a chemical
substance, the firms either will provide the information requested
or will litigate EPA's authority to regulate. If companies choose to
comply, then EPA may begin compiling an adequate registry. If
the firms contest the regulations, resolution of the scope of the
agency's authority will occur early in the development of the new
biotechnologies. EPA's authority to demand information is only
meaningful if the agency exercises its power to assemble a registry.
EPA's past and current unwillingness to do so is unfortunate be-
cause the agency may lose the opportunity to regulate and monitor
unintrusively this important emerging technology. If the new tech-
nology does prove hazardous, EPA once again will have to imple-
ment a regulatory scheme hastily and reactively.
2. Surveillance of Technologies in Operation
Even if EPA cannot compile a central registry, some agency
may be able to gather information on the potential risks of the
biotechnology industry by monitoring, conducting inspections, and
requiring regulatees to keep adequate records. This surveillance
function would be essential for the enforcement of any regulatory
controls that the agency promulgates. Ideally, the regulatory
agency should have authority to place the burden of monitoring
and data gathering upon the regulatee. The agency might require
the regulatee to monitor the workplace and the environment for
the presence of genetically altered micro-organisms, to validate
micro-organism kills in fermentation technologies, to monitor for
any ill effects in employees and the surrounding environment, and
to test products, by-products, and micro-organisms for toxicity and
other undesirable characteristics.
Section 8(a) of the TSCA gives EPA authority to require com-
panies, other than small manufacturers,0 6 to "maintain such
206. The statute defines small manufacturers according to standards prescribed by
EPA after consultation with the Small Business Administration. See 15 U.S.C. §
2607(a)(3)(B) (1976), 40 C.F.R. §§ 710, 712 (1982).
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records and . . . submit ... such reports as [EPA] may reasona-
bly require. '"207 The statute appears to give the agency adequate
authority to require firms to inform it of potential systematic em-
ployee and environmental exposure to genetically engineered
micro-organisms, their products, and by-products in the fermenta-
tion industry and in other large-scale applications. °0 In addition to
EPA's recordkeeping authority, section 8(a)(2)(E) of the TSCA
gives EPA the power to require manufacturers to submit "all ex-
isting data concerning the environmental and health effects of such
substance or mixture" insofar as the data are known or reasonably
ascertainable. 09 This requirement could provide EPA with existing
studies on the survivability of host organisms in human and other
environmental systems. Moreover, EPA could demand that compa-
nies make available relevant reports that characterize genetically
engineered organisms and any existing risk assessments performed
on these organisms.
Section 8(c) of the TSCA independently requires the manufac-
turer, processor, and distributor of a chemical substance to "main-
tain records of significant adverse reactions to health or the envi-
ronment. . . alleged to have been caused by the substance, 2 10 and
section 8(e) requires manufacturers, processors, and distributors
who obtain information "which reasonably supports the conclusion
207. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(1)(A) (1976). Such records and reports may include:
(1) The common or trade name, the chemical identity, and the molecular structure of
each chemical substance or mixture for which such a report is required.
(2) The categories or proposed categories of use of each such substance or mixture.
(3) The total amount of each such substance and mixture manufactured or processed,
reasonable estimates of the total amount to be manufactured or processed for each of
its categories of use, and reasonable estimates of the amount to be manufactured or
processed for each of its categories of use or proposed categories of use.
(4) A description of the by-products resulting from the manufacture, processing, use, or
disposal of each such substance or mixture.
(5) All existing data concerning the environmental and health effects of such substance
or mixture.
(6) The number of individuals exposed, and reasonable estimates of the number who
will be exposed, to such substance or mixture in their places of employment and the
duration of such exposure.
(7) In the initial report under paragraph (1) on such substance or mixture, the manner
or method of its disposal, and in any subsequent report on such substance or mixture,
any change in such manner or method.
Id. § 2607(a)(2).
208. The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the RCRA give EPA similar record-
keeping authority. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(1),
6923(a)(1), 6924(1), 6925(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (Supp. V 1981).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2)(E) (1976).
210. Id. § 2607(c).
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that such substance or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury
to health or the environment" to inform the EPA immediately of
that information.21' These statutory sections appear to provide suf-
ficient authority to require biotechnology firms to report diseases
caused by exposure to products and by-products of genetic tech-
nologies. Whether the provisions give EPA power to compel infor-
mation about diseases that result from genetically engineered
pathogenic organisms depends upon whether the DNA within the
organisms caused the diseases. 212 Similarly, whether the DNA
presents a substantial risk of injury determines whether the sub-
stantial risk notice requirement applies to pathogenic organisms.
Section 11 of the TSCA21 3 allows a duly designated represen-
tative of EPA to inspect any establishment that engages in manu-
facturing or processing of chemical substances or mixtures.2 14 This
provision appears to grant EPA sufficient authority to require
firms to allow agency employees or designated representatives to
monitor facilities for human and environmental exposure to micro-
organisms and for possible diseases resulting from these organisms.
Although section 11 does not grant EPA authority to require firms
to self-monitor, section 6(a)(4)215 of the TSCA provides that EPA
by rule may require manufacturers and processors of a chemical
substance to "monitor or conduct tests which are reasonable and
necessary to assure compliance with the . .. rule. 21 6 Before the
agency may promulgate a section 6 rule, however, it first must
make the threshold determination that the manufacture or
processing of the chemical substance "presents or will present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. 2 17 This
limitation will preclude section 6(a)(4) from serving as a useful
mechanism for acquiring information during the initial stages of
211. Id. § 2607(e).
212. This statement assumes that DNA is a chemical substance or mixture. See supra
notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1976).
214. The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the RCRA give EPA similar author-
ity to inspect regulatees' facilities. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. §
6927 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (Supp. V 1981). Section 6 of the TSCA empowers EPA to
require monitoring. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1976). EPA, however, only may exercise this authority
pursuant to a § 6 rule that requires a threshold determination of unreasonable risk. As
previously discussed, this finding is difficult to make during the early stages of the develop-
ment of industrial biotechnologies. See supra part III(B).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(4) (1976).
216. Id.
217. Id. § 2605(a).
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the development of genetic technologies.218
Section 4 of the TSCA21 9 supplements EPA's extensive data
gathering authority. This provision allows the agency to order com-
panies to conduct testing in accordance with specified standards on
a substance or mixture to develop data about its health and envi-
ronmental effects.220 The determination whether a substance poses
an unreasonable risk will be difficult for the agency to make in the
abstract. Conceivably, some forms of altered DNA in certain kinds
of micro-organisms could produce substances that are harmful to
humans and the environment. Existing risk assessments on a few
industrially useful micro-organisms, however, indicate that human
or environmental exposure to these organisms will pose no unrea-
sonable risks regardless of the organisms' genetic alterations.
Hence, EPA justifiably might decline to require testing for whole
strains of genetically altered bacteria once the agency has estab-
lished the safety of the bacteria itself. On the other hand, EPA
might require testing on the effects of DNA in micro-organisms
that it has not yet fully characterized and determined to be suffi-
ciently safe.
Even if EPA cannot determine that genetically altered DNA
within a micro-organism may pose unreasonable risks, as section 4
of the TSCA requires, the agency may order testing if a company
produces the substance in large quantities that will enter the envi-
ronment or result in substantial human exposure.221 While en-
closed fermentation processes probably do not meet this test,
large-scale industrial use of genetically altered micro-organisms in
the environment-for example, for leaching minerals or disgesting
oil spills-easily could satisfy the requirement.22
218. See supra note 199.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976).
220. Id. § 2603(a). Before EPA may order testing, it first must determine that:
(i) the manufacture, distribution in commerce, processing, use, or disposal of a chemical
substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activites, may present an unreasona-
ble risk of injury to health or the environment, and (ii) there are insufficient data and expe-
rience to predict the effects of the substance on health or the environment, and (iii) testing
is necessary to develop adequate data.
Id. The TSCA establishes a committee to make recommendations to the Administrator of
EPA concerning which chemical substances or mixtures should receive priority testing. Id. §
2603(e) (1976).
221. Id. § 2603(a)(B)(i).
222. Section 3013 of the RCRA authorizes EPA to require the owner or operator of a
facility to conduct monitoring, testing, or analysis when the agency determines that the
presence of any hazardous waste at the facility, or the release of any such waste from the
facility, may present a substantial hazard to human health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. §
6934 (Supp. V 1981). Section 3013 is highly significant because it provides the Administra-
[Vol. 36:461
GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES
The OSHAct gives OSHA and NIOSH extensive authority to
acquire and analyze data on possible diseases attributable to newly
emerging genetic technologies. Section 20 of the OSHAct empow-
ers NIOSH to gather information on workplace safety and "con-
duct (directly or by grants or contracts) research, experiments, and
demonstrations relating to occupational safety and health
. ... ,,23 In particular, section 20(a)(4) authorizes NIOSH to "con-
duct special research, experiments and demonstrations relating to
occupational safety and health as are necessary to explore new
problems, including those created by new technology in occupa-
tional safety and health, which may require ameliorative action be-
yond that which is otherwise provided for in the operating provi-
sions of this Act. ' 224 Pursuant to this authority NIOSH currently
is conducting a study of risks that the fermentation industry poses
to workers. The agency intends ultimately to make a general as-
sessment of those risks.225
Under section 8(a) of the OSHAct,2 6 NIOSH and OSHA offi-
cials have authority to enter workplaces at reasonable hours to
conduct reasonable investigations of conditions therein. 27 In addi-
tion, section 8(c)(1) of the OSHAct requires employers to "make,
keep and preserve" such records as the Secretary of Labor, in co-
operation with the Secretary of HHS, prescribes by regulation as
"necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of [the OSHAct] or
for developing information regarding the causes and prevention of
occupational accidents and illnesses. '228 These regulations may
"include provisions requiring employers to conduct periodic in-
spections. '2'  They appear to provide adequate authority for
tor of EPA with the necessary power to order continuous monitoring and to obtain informa-
tion from both inactive and active disposal sites. Id.
223. 29 U.S.C. § 669 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
224. Id. § 669(a)(4).
225. See Division of Surveillance, Hazard Evaluations and Field Studies, National In-
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health, Medical Surveillance of Biotechnology Work-
ers: Report of the CDC/NIOSH Ad Hoc Working Group on Medical Surveillance for Indus-
trial Applications of Biotechnology, 5 NIH RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 133
(1982).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
227. See id. Section 20 gives NIOSH the power to enter and investigate workplaces.
Id. § 669. If an employer refuses to allow inspection of his premises, OSHA must obtain a
warrant before entry. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1978). A showing of
probable cause in the strict criminal law sense, however, is not a prerequisite to obtaining a
warrant. An agency may establish probable cause merely by showing that its inspection is
part of a general administrative plan for enforcing the Act. Id. at 321.




OSHA to require employers to monitor periodically the workplace
environment near physical containment facilities for escaped
micro-organisms. Arguably, section 8(c)(1) also permits OSHA to
demand that employers convey to the agency the identities of
hosts, vectors, genetic sequences, products, and by-products of par-
ticular genetic engineering technologies. OSHA, however, must es-
tablish whether these reporting requirements would be "necessary
or appropriate" to "developing information regarding the causes
and prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses.
'230
Section 8(c)(2) of the OSHAct231 requires the Secretary of La-
bor, in cooperation with the Secretary of HHS, to prescribe regula-
tions "requiring employers to maintain accurate records of, and to
make periodic reports on, work-related deaths, injuries, and ill-
nesses other than minor injuries. ' 23 2 In addition, section 8(c)(3)
provides that OSHA must issue regulations instructing employers
to maintain accurate records of employees' exposures to potentially
toxic materials or harmful physical agents that are subject to the
monitoring requirements of section 6 of the OSHAct.213 These pro-
visions apparently permit OSHA to establish a registry of diseases
that cause serious injuries to workers. Whether OSHA may require
reporting of worker exposures to genetically engineered micro-or-
ganisms absent a clearly demonstrated serious injury depends
upon whether the organisms fall within section 6.234
Although the OSHAct clearly authorizes OSHA and NIOSH to
compile information on the risks that new biotechnologies pose to
workers, the agencies' ability to acquire data concerning hazards to
the environment is much less clear. Since workers often are on the
front line when the new technological risks emerge, the existing





231. Id. § 657(c)(2).
232. Id.
233. Id. § 657(c)(3); see id. § 655.
234. See id. § 655; infra text accompanying notes 247-55.
235. Certain limitations exist on OSHA's regulatory authority. For example, federal
agency employees and state and local government workers are exempt from OSHAct's cov-
erage. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In addition, the Act covers only employers
engaged in a business "affecting commerce." Id. The courts, however, have given this phrase
a rather expansive meaning. For a general discussion of these issues, see G. NOTHSTEIN, THE
LAW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 32-55 (1981).
236. NIOSH has exhibited a commendable interest in the emerging biotechnologies
and has conducted several site inspections of plants that use genetically engineered biotech-
nologies. While governmental budgetary cutbacks may curtail the work of this program, the
[Vol. 36:461
GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES
The FFDCA23 7 gives the FDA extensive monitoring and data
gathering authority, depending upon how "new" the agency be-
lieves a product might be. 3s Except for a generic or so-called "me-
too" version of a previously approved drug, 3 9 a manufacturer
whose drug is subject to FDA's jurisdiction must submit a New
Drug Application (NDA) containing the results of a full range of
preclinical and clinical testing; a complete list of the raw materials
used to manufacture the drug; the drug's composition; a full
description of the methods employed in manufacturing, processing,
and packaging the drug; and specimens of the proposed labeling.
240
This "full NDA" procedure,241 which Congress and the Reagan Ad-
ministration recently have criticized, typically requires years of
testing and major financial expenditures.
2 42
FDA has not announced an official policy for regulating ge-
netic technologies. At one time it proposed incorporating the NIH
Guidelines243 into its regulatory plans, but recently FDA seems to
have retreated from this position. 4 Agency officials commenting
in scholarly publications are the best sources of current FDA pol-
icy.2 5 For example, Dr. Henry Miller has written that when consis-
tent with individual bureau policy2 46 FDA should require an NDA
for every product that uses rDNA technology, even if the product
public interest requires that these inspections continue. Constant monitoring can identify
potential problems before they grow into significant health risks.
237. EPA has similar power under the FIFRA to require health and safety testing for
pesticides. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Since the two laws are very similar
on this issue, this Article will not discuss in detail the FIFRA's data gathering requirements.
238. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
239. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.1(f) (1982). One commentator has argued that genetically
engineered "me-too" drugs should get full NDA treatment. See Miller, The Impact of New
Technology on Regulation by the FDA: Recombinant DNA Technology, 36 FooD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 348, 351-52 (1981).
240. 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 (1982).
241. See Oversight-The Food and Drug Administration's Process for Approving
New Drugs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); Korwek & Trinker,
supra note 148, at 521.
242. For example, because genetically engineered human growth hormone is not chem-
ically identical to the native hormone-which already is the subject of an NDA-FDA has
stated that it will require preclinical testing as well as full human clinical trials.
243. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976); see supra part IV(A)(1).
244. See 43 Fed. Reg. 60,134 (1978) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 59).
245. Personal communication from Dr. Henry Miller, medical officer, Bureau of Drugs,
FDA, to Mr. K. Bayer (1983).
246. Each bureau within FDA functions autonomously. Thus, FDA's notion of requir-
ing an NDA when consistent with bureau policy could create substantial internal variation
in the regulation of different products. Data requirements almost certainly would vary from
product to product. See Miller, supra note 239, at 351.
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is identical to a previously approved product or a natural sub-
stance.247 Moreover, Dr. Miller reports that FDA does not plan to
promulgate any additional "Good Manufacturing Practices"248 for
drugs or to extend its control over genetic technology through
NEPA24 or section 361 of PHSA. 50
C. Risk Assessment
EPA, FDA, OSHA, and NIOSH have authority to use infor-
mation that they acquire on their own or from regulatees to assess
the risks of newly emerging biotechnologies. Whether the agencies
can perform risk assessments as information becomes available to
them depends upon whether they develop and use the data aggres-
sively. Although EPA, OSHA, and NIOSH have little, if any, ex-
pertise in assessing microbiological risks, they do have substantial
skill in evaluating the hazards of the chemical products and by-
products of biotechnologies. The Center for Disease Control, on
the other hand, is the nation's chief repository for determining the
risks of infective organisms. An interagency effort best might ac-
complish a holistic assessment of all the dangers posed by a partic-
ular biotechnology. The Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group,
which consisted of representatives from EPA, FDA, OSHA, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Department of Ag-
riculture offered an ideal vehicle for initiating cooperative risk as-
sessment efforts. 51 The Reagan Administration, however, has dis-
banded that organization. Another vehicle for ensuring the
performance of complete risk analyses for emerging biotechnolo-
gies is an interagency memorandum of understanding that would
divide up responsibility for performing risk assessments as infor-
mation becomes available.
247. MILLER, PROCEEDINGS OF BANBURY CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL APPLICATION OF RE-
COMBINANT DNA (1983) (forthcoming).
248. See infra notes 253-64 and accompanying text.
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976).
250. Miller, supra note 247, at - (forthcoming). Section 361 gives FDA broad au-
thority to regulate dangerous micro-organisms. The provision, however, is unclear whether
that authority could extend to surveillance for latent or potential problems. The relatively
small staff of the Center for Disease Control, which presumably would perform the actual
surveillance, probably is incapable of adequately monitoring the new biotechnologies at its
present size.
251. See Draft Work Plans of the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, 1 CHEM.




The existing statutes provide the administering agencies with
a large arsenal of regulatory requirements. Most product licensing
statutes give the agency broad authority to condition a license on
virtually any reasonable requirement. Other statutes, such as the
TSCA and the OSHAct, empower the agency to intervene into the
manufacturing and distribution process. The Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, and the RCRA give the agency power to control
only unwanted by-products of the manufacturing process. Each
statute provides sanctions for violations of validly promulgated
regulatory requirements.2 52 An important distinction exists be-
tween the regulatory tools available in fermentation technologies
and the measures available in large-scale release technologies. A
regulatory mechanism that is adequate for one kind of technology
may be entirely inappropriate for another kind.
1. Product Licensing
Section 501(a)(1) of the FFDCA provides that the agency shall
deem a drug adulterated if it "consists in whole or in part of any
filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance .... ,153 According to sec-
tion 501(a)(2)(A), a drug is adulterated "if it has been prepared,
packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
been contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been ren-
dered injurious to health ... ."I" Subsection (a)(2)(B) requires
the agency to establish drug "good manufacturing practices"
(GMPs).255 The agency must find a drug adulterated if "the meth-
ods used in, or the facilities. . . used for, its manufacture, process-
ing, packing, or holding do not conform to or are not operated...
in conformity with current good manufacturing practice ....
FDA rarely invokes these two subsections to seize drug products.
According to Dr. Korwek, the drug GMP Regulations, promulgated
252. The statutes provide for sanctions that may include, inter alia, the imposition of
civil and criminal penalties, revocation of permits or licenses, and imprisonment for specific
violations. In addition, agencies may secure compliance with the applicable regulations by
issuing administrative orders or obtaining injunctive relief in federal district courts. For ex-
ample, a violation of certain requirements of the TSCA can result in civil penalties of up to
$25,000 per day. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1976). A knowing or willful violation can result in
an additional fine of up to $25,000 per day and imprisonment for up to one year. Id. §
2615(b). Section 7 of the TSCA authorizes injunctive relief. Id. § 2616.
253. 21 U.S.C.A. § 351(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
254. Id. § 351(a)(2)(A).




under section 501(a)(2)(B), "provide more objective standards for
enforcement than do the subjective lack of cleanliness require-
ments ... .5 Therefore, although an agency could use subsec-
tions (a)(1) and (a)(2)(A) to support requirements that protect
humans and the environment from genetically engineered micro-
organisms and their by-products, FDA is unlikely to rely on those
provisions given the authority available in subsection (a)(2)(B).258
While it could be argued that the extremely broad GMPs
might be beyond FDA's authority under section 501(a)(2)(B), 59
the cases have been limited to constitutional claims that section
501(a)(2)(B) is void for vagueness. According to Dr. Korwek, these
challenges generally have failed. The courts have held that the
GMP Regulations "properly elaborate upon the Act, ' 260 meaning-
fully "refer to business practice and usage, ' 261 and "have been
promulgated with active participation by industry. '262 These cases,
as Dr. Korwek notes, have cited the general health protection pur-
poses of the FFDCA, the strong presumption of statutory validity
in upholding the Regulations, and FDA's statutory authority under
the FFDCA.263 A number of courts have stated that in public
257. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Author-
ity of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, supra note 148, at 641; see also 21
C.F.R. §§ 210-226 (1982); see generally United States v. Article of Drug Labeled "White
Quadrisect," 484 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1973) ("good manufacturing practices" not unconstitu-
tionally vague).
258. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Author-
ity of FDA to Require Compliance with the- Guidelines, supra note 148, at 641. FDA has
stated that drug GMPs will be the vehicle for incorporating the NIH Guidelines into FDA's
regulatory regime. Id.
259. See id. Section 501(a)(2)(B) applies to "drugs." 21 U.S.C.A. § 351(a)(2)(B) (West
Supp. 1982). Although the GMP Regulations do not define explicitly good manufacturing
practices, they do specify criteria for buildings, equipment, components, product containers,
laboratory controls, personnel, packaging, labeling, records, and reports used in the manu-
facture, processing, packaging, or holding of drug products. 21 C.F.R. §§ 210-226 (1982).
260. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Author-
ity of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, supra note 148, at 641-42; see, e.g.,
United States v. Article of Drug Labeled "White Quadrisect," 484 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1973).
261. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Author-
ity of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, supra note 148, at 641-42; see, e.g.,
United States v. Bel-Mar Laboratories, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
262. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Author-
ity of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, supra note 148, at 641-42; see, e.g.,
United States v. Bel-mar Laboratories, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
263. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Author-
ity of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, supra note 148, at 642. The deci-
sions addressing the validity of the food GMPs, which are similar in scope and authority to
drug GMPs, have affirmed the broad authority of FDA under the FFDCA to issue such
regulations. See, e.g., National Confectioners Ass'n v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir.
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health matters judges should construe liberally the FFDCA.264
FDA could amend its GMP Regulations to encompass any ad-
ditional risks posed by genetically engineered micro-organisms.26 5
The GMP Regulations adopt a technology-based approach that is
consistent with the regulatory needs for newly emerging fermenta-
tion technologies. The Regulations are generic but amendments
could prescribe case by case controls when necessary. Although
worker protection is not expressly within FDA's authority, the
GMPs do contain receptor-oriented requirements that protect em-
ployees as well as product purity. FDA, however, could amend its
GMP Regulations to reflect a receptor-oriented approach only to
the extent that the worker protection effort coincided with the
agency's authority to regulate product quality.
FDA would have considerable difficulty amending the GMPs
to protect the environment. The National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), however, may bolster FDA's legal authority to de-
mand compliance with regulations aimed at protecting health and
the environment. Although the NEPA requires that federal agen-
cies consider environmental effects "to the fullest extent possible"
in their planning and decisionmaking, 2 "6 the statute may not give
FDA the authority to force companies to comply with environmen-
tally protective GMPs. FDA has promulgated regulations imple-
menting section 102(2)(c) of the NEPA, s7 which provides that an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must accompany any pro-
posal for federal action affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.2 8 Exemptions, however, are available for whole categories of
1978); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1977);
Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1953); Berger v.
United States, 200 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1952).
264. See supra note 263 and authorities cited therein.
265. On December 22, 1978, FDA announced its intention "to propose regulations to
require that any firm seeking approval of a product requiring the use of recombinant DNA
methods in its development or manufacture demostrate the firm's compliance with the re-
quirements of the NIH Guidelines... with any work it has done or will do relating to that
product." 43 Fed. Reg. 60,134 (1978) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 59). In particular, FDA
announced that it would require this assurance "in notices of claimed investigational ex-
emption of new drugs (INB's) . . . , NDA's. . . , license applications for biologic products,
requests for certification for antibiotics, feed additive petitions, and new animal drug appli-
cations (NADA's)." Id. Further, FDA intends to propose incorporation of the NIH guide-
lines in GMP Regulations if an applicant proposes rDNA techniques for manufacturing
commercially distributed products. Id.
266. National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
267. National Environmental Policy Act § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
268. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 25 (1982) (environmental impact considerations).
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drugs, animal drugs, and food additives2 69 because FDA approvals
normally do not significantly affect environmental quality. Fur-
thermore, FDA can avoid filing an EIS in individual cases by mak-
ing a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI).
Arguably, the NEPA alone does not give the agency sufficient
substantive authority to withhold its approval of a drug solely be-
cause of the environmental effects of the manufacturing process.
Little litigation has arisen over the extent to which the NEPA im-
poses a duty upon each federal official to protect the environment.
Nonetheless, in three important cases courts have upheld the au-
thority and responsibility of agencies to protect the environment
under the NEPA.2 70 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ma-
thews 271 the court held that FDA has authority under the NEPA
to evaluate the environmental effects of its decisions. Whether
FDA may base its action exclusively on environmental considera-
tions remains an open question.272 Clearly, however, a reviewing
court may not require FDA to elevate environmental issues over
other appropriate concerns. The United States Supreme Court in
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen273 held that
once an agency has made a decision pursuant to the NEPA's pro-
cedural requirements, the only role for a court is to ensure that the
agency considered the environmental consequences.274
According to Dr. Miller,2 75 environmental impact is an integral
consideration in FDA's regulatory process.
FDA regulations provide that applicants seeking premarket approval file an
Environmental Impact Analysis Report (EIAR). If... the data in the assess-
ment leads [FDA to find] that a proposed action will have a significant im-
pact upon the quality of the human environment, the Agency [must] prepare
an . . . (EIS) to ensure that environmental consequences are considered in
269. See id. § 25.1(f).
270. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 209-14 (5th Cir.
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 337-38 (D.D.C.
1976); see also McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX.
L. REv. 801, 864-67 (1977) (discussion of cited cases).
271. 410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976).
272. Language in Mathews indicates that FDA probably must consider other ele-
ments: "NEPA requires FDA to consider environmental factors in its decision-making pro-
cess and supplements its existing authority to permit it to act on those considerations." Id.
at 338 (emphasis in original). "It permits FDA to base a decision upon environmental fac-
tors, when balanced with other relevant considerations." Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
273. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
274. Id. at 228.
275. See Miller, supra note 239, at 352.
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the decision-making 2 76
Relying on the NEPA, FDA could take the position that its ap-
proval of products manufactured in compliance with environmen-
tally protective GMPs, as amended, will not "significantly affect"
the environment and, hence, FDA need not develop an EIS for
these products. Alternatively, FDA could threaten to initiate the
time-consuming full-scale EIS process unless an applicant demon-
strated that it manufactured the product in accordance with the
amended GMPs.2"
Despite the lack of an official FDA position and the heated
theoretical debate on the extent of FDA's authority, FDA currently
is regulating genetic technologies.27 8 Anticipating the submission of
INDs and NDAs for substances produced by genetic technologies,
FDA added to its staff several medical doctors and Ph.Ds with re-
cent laboratory experience in the science and technology of rDNA.
With this new expertise and the agency's lengthy experience in
premarket approval procedures and the GMP Regulations, FDA
believes that it can accommodate the new manufacturing technol-
ogy.27 FDA, however, will not apply a uniform regulatory scheme
because it has different statutory requirements for different prod-
uct classes-drugs, food additives, biologics, and devices. Rather,
the agency intends to regulate product by product through its
bureaus. 8 0
EPA, like FDA, has authority to condition its grant of a pesti-
276. Id.
277. FDA is considering informing industry that "a manufacturer's compliance with
* . . NIH Guidelines [will mitigate] potential adverse effects to the environment from [the]
new technology." Id. After making these assurances, FDA usually "would not seek. . . fur-
ther environmental review in the form of an EIS, with regard to those particular aspects of
the technology." Id. FDA easily could expand this approach to include compliance with
amended GMPs that focus on technological application as well as on research.
278. FDA's own assessment of the pharmaceuticals that are made using genetic engi-
neering techniques includes the following regulated products: (1) Drugs-Human Insulin;
Human Growth Hormone (or Analogs); Thymosin; ACTH: Endorphins; DNA; (2) Bio-
logics-Interferons; Vaccines, including Hepatitis B and Influenza; Serum Albumin;
Urokinase; DNA; (3) Foods-Certain enzymes used in food processing; and (4) Medical De-
vices-in vitro diagnostic tests (e.g., Glucose Oxidase); specific in utero diagnostic tests
(e.g., Thalassemia, Sickle-cell Anemia). See Miller, supra note 239, at 350.
279. Id. at 351.
280. Recently, the FDA commissioner established the rDNA Coordinating Committee.
The deputy associate commissioner for health affairs and science chairs the Committee,
which "has representatives from the Bureaus, the Office of Regulatory Affairs, Executive
Director for Regional Operations (EDRO) and General Counsel. The Committee will serve
as the focus of Recombinant DNA policy issues, coordinating, advising and interacting with
FDA's various organizational units." Id. at 353.
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cide registration upon the assurance that the product and its pro-
duction processes are not environmentally harmful.28 ' Although
EPA has no special guidelines for genetically engineered pesticidal
micro-organisms, the agency must approve new genetically engi-
neered organisms before a company may market them.282 There-
fore, a company would be wise to follow EPA's guidelines in test-
ing the product. The testing process itself can be very expensive;
some cost estimates range as high as seven million dollars.8 3 Un-
like FDA's GMPs, the testing guidelines do not address health
hazards in the workplace. Instead, they focus exclusively on pro-
viding information for the evaluation of the risks and benefits of
pesticide products.8 4 EPA generally has little concern for the im-
purities and other pesticidally inactive by-products that the prod-
uct which reaches the public may contain. Thus, EPA probably
will not use its FIFRA authority to erect a regulatory structure for
the manufacturing process. The TSCA is probably the better vehi-
cle for process requirements.
Clearly, existing product licensing statutes offer some author-
ity to regulate genetic technologies. FDA's GMP Regulations offer
an especially convenient vehicle for comprehensive regulation
should the agency deem it necessary. The FFDCA and the FIFRA,
however, at best can address only the health and environmental
effects of specific products and their manufacturing technologies.
Neither statute would be appropriate for regulating large-scale ap-
plication of genetically altered micro-organisms other than those
used for pesticides. Furthermore,, both statutes only give the agen-
cies authority to regulate products or processes that require licens-
ing. Thus, even a combination of both statutes provides an inade-
quate regulatory framework.
2. Production Processes
The government could construct its most comprehensive regu-
latory scheme for genetic technology around one or more of the
statutes that give agencies authority over production processes.
These statutes require an agency to intervene in a firm's decision-
making process once the agency has made a threshold showing of
281. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(1) (1976).
282. Persons cannot sell pesticides that are not registered with the administrator. Id. §
136a(a). If the agency does not approve the pesticide, the administrator may deny registra-
tion. Id. §§ 136a(c)(5)-(6).
283. See S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1977).




Section 6(b)(1) of the OSHAct gives OSHA authority to pro-
mulgate "occupational safety and health standard[s] ...in order
to serve the objectives of this [Act]. .. . Section 3(8) defines
the term "occupational safety and health standard" to mean "a
standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one
or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment and places of employment.", 8 Section 6(b)(5) further
elaborates' on occupational safety and health standards for "toxic
materials or harmful physical agents." For these substances, OSHA
must
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material im-
pairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his
working life.
287
The Supreme Court recently has wrestled with the meaning of
these three interrelated phrases in cases concerning OSHA's at-
tempts to set standards for workplace exposure to benzene and
cotton dust. In Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute"8 a plurality of the Court held that
OSHA may not promulgate a standard requiring reduced exposure
to a toxic substance or harmful physical agent unless this reduced
exposure is "reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a sig-
nificant risk of material health impairment. ' 28 9 OSHA was not at
liberty to assume that a substance that causes leukemia in workers
at ten parts per million poses a significant risk to employees sub-
ject to current exposure levels of one part per million or less. In
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,290
however, the Court held that OSHA need not weigh a standard's
costs against its benefits prior to imposing the requirement upon
employers. As long as a standard is necessary to reduce or elimi-
285. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)-(b)(1) (1976). In addition, every employer under section
5(a)(1) of the Act has a "general duty" to "furnish to each of his employees employment
and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." Id. § 654(a)(1). OSHA can
enforce this general duty clause at its own discretion. United States Steelworkers of Am. v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1980).
286. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
287. Id. § 655(b)(5).
288. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
289. Id. at 639.
290. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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nate a significant risk, OSHA may require employers to inplement
all feasible control devices, even over objections that the costs of
implementing the controls far exceed the projected benefits. In-
deed, the Court strongly suggested that the statute does not allow
the agency to use a balancing approach when it stated that "cost-
benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because
feasibility (technology-based) analysis is."
2 91
Although genetically engineered micro-organisms arguably are
not "toxic materials or harmful physical agents," Congress appar-
ently intended the terms to be sufficiently inclusive to reach orga-
nisms that posed a significant risk to workers. 9 2 Even if genetically
engineered industrial micro-organisms do not fit this definition,
OSHA still could promulgate standards under section 6(b)(1) pro-
vided the standard was "reasonably necessary. . to provide safe
or healthful employment and places of employment."293 Section
6(b) (5) appears to provide adequate authority for setting standards
for physical containment of organisms that pose a significant risk
of harm to workers. OSHA might specify a media quality-based
ambient exposure level for the relevant micro-organisms, products,
and by-products. Alternatively, it might specify technology-based
requirements for containment vessels or receptor-oriented technol-
ogy-based standards for personal protective gear.29 4
Any occupational health standard promulgated under section
6 must "prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of
warning as are necessary to insure that employees are apprised of
all hazards to which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and ap-
propriate emergency treatment, and proper conditions and precau-
tions of safe use or exposure." 9 5 This provision would allow OSHA
to require manufacturers to educate employees about the risks of
substances that the agency regulates under section 6. In addition,
OSHA has proposed pursuant to section 6(b)(7) of the OSHAct ge-
neric labeling regulations requiring employers to inform employees
of risks of hazardous materials in the workplace.296 Finally, when
appropriate, a section 6 occupational health standard must "pro-
291. Id. at 509.
292. Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir.
1974).
293. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
294. In the past OSHA has preferred engineering and design controls over personal
protective devices, although it may be changing its position on this issue.
295. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1976).
296. Hazard Communication, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Public Hearings, 47
Fed. Reg. 12,092 (1982) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910).
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vide for monitoring or measuring employee exposure at such loca-
tions and intervals, and in such manner as may be necessary for
the protection of employees. '297 This standard may prescribe the
type and frequency of medical examinations or other tests that the
employer shall make available to exposed employees. This section
of the statute gives adequate authority to require monitoring of
employee exposure and health but only after the Secretary has de-
termined that sufficient danger exists to warrant the promulgation
of an occupational health standard. Nevertheless, this monitoring
should be valuable in assessing the efficacy of the standard in
operation.
OSHA, like FDA, has no clear authority to protect the envi-
ronment. The limitation on environmental protection authority
may not be especially significant for the infective risks of fermen-
tation technologies because worker protection standards probably
will have the effect of protecting other humans and the environ-
ment. For technologies that use large-scale application of geneti-
cally engineered micro-organisms, however, measures designed to
protect workers alone may not be adequate to safeguard the envi-
ronment..29  To the extent that OSHA's authority is insufficient to
protect the environment, the TSCA grants EPA authority to fill
the gaps. If EPA determines that it has a "reasonable basis to con-
clude that the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or dispo-
sal of a chemical substance. . . will present an 'unreasonable risk
of injury to health or the environment'," it may apply any of sev-
eral requirements set forth in the statute.9 9 In addition, if EPA
has a "reasonable basis to conclude" that a particular manufac-
turer or processor is making a chemical substance or mixture in a
297. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1976).
298. OSHA may rely on the NEPA for authority to allow it to promulgate environ-
mental protection regulations. See supra notes 266-77 and accompanying text. OSHA, like
other agencies, must consider the environmental effects of its actions and prepare EISs for
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. See Dry
Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973).
299. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1976). EPA may apply:
(1) A requirement prohibiting the manufacture, processing, and distribution of the sub-
stance entirely or for a particular use; (2) A requirement limiting the amount of the sub-
stance which may be manufactured, processed, and distributed; (3) A labelling or warning
requirement; (4) A recordkeeping requirement; (5) A monitoring requirement; (6) A require-
ment prohibiting or otherwise regulating any manner or method of commercial use of the
substance; (7) A requirement prohibiting or otherwise regulating any manner or method of
disposal of the substance; (8) A requirement directing manufacturers of processors to give
notice to the public and to distributors of such unreasonable risks and to replace or repur-




manner that unintentionally creates an unreasonable risk, EPA
may require the manufacturer or processor to submit a description
of its quality control procedures. 00 If EPA determines that the
quality control procedures are inadequate to prevent the substance
from posing an unreasonable risk, the agency may order the manu-
facturer to revise its quality control procedures as necessary to
remedy the inadequacy." 1
Assuming that the substance meets the "unreasonable risk"
threshold and that the DNA in micro-organisms is a chemical sub-
stance or mixture, sufficient authority exists in section 6 for EPA
to require technology-based commands for the physical contain-
ment of these organisms. Moreover, section 6(a)(5) may provide
EPA with adequate authority to demand the use of only "safe"
hosts.30 2 In addition, EPA may have the power to specify hosts
under its section 6(b) authority to revise quality control proce-
dures.303 Section 6(b), however, presumably would require a show-
ing that a less risky host could produce the same end product. The
labeling and warning provisions of sections 6(a)(3) and 6(a)(7) au-
thorize the agency to educate and inform workers and others who
suffer exposure to genetically engineered micro-organisms, their
products, or by-products.304
Section 6 of the TSCA envisions primarily source-oriented
commands. EPA, however, could promulgate receptor-oriented re-
quirements pursuant to its authority under section 6(a)(5) to regu-
late any manner or method of commercial use of a chemical sub-
300. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1) (1976).
301. Id. § 2605(b)(2).
302. Specifying appropriate hosts arguably regulates the commercial use of the DNA,
as permitted under § 6(a)(5). See id. § 2605(a)(5).
303. Id. § 2605(b).
304. See id. §§ 2605(a)(3), (7). Note, however, that Congress in § 6(c)(1) of the TSCA
indicated that EPA should use regulatory tools other than § 6(a) when feasible. Section
6(c)(1) provides:
If the Administrator determines that a risk of injury to health or the environment
could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by actions taken under another
Federal law (or laws) administered in whole or in part by the Administrator, the Ad-
ministrator may not promulgate a rule under subsection (a) of this section to protect
against such risk of injury unless the Administrator finds, in the Administrator's dis-
cretion, that it is in the public interest to protect against such risk under this chapter.
In making such a finding the Administrator shall consider (i) all relevant aspects of the
risk, as determined by the Administrator in the Administrator's discretion, (ii) a com-
parison of the estimated costs of complying with actions taken under this chapter and





stance. Section 6 also seems to provide for technology-based
commands or outright prohibitions rather than media quality-
based requirements or incentives. EPA is powerless to invoke sec-
tion 6 if it cannot make a threshold showing of unreasonable risk.
This test connotes a balancing of risks against benefits, and the
command that EPA select the "least burdensome" of its regulatory
options indicates that Congress intended EPA to strike that bal-
ance in favor of allowing the use of the substance if at all possible.
The preceding analysis suggests that EPA alone or in coopera-
tion with OSHA probably has authority to implement an appropri-
ate regulatory strategy for genetic technologies. Although the stat-
utes do not explicitly authorize incentives, such an approach
probably would be premature anyway at this stage in the develop-
ment of genetic engineering technologies.
30 5
If the courts hold that genetically altered DNA in a host cell is
not a chemical substance, OSHA may have to turn to FDA for as-
sistance in protecting nonworkers and the environment. Section
361 of the PHSA is available for regulators to prevent the spread
of communicable disease. Although this provision does not give
FDA authority to regulate products and by-products of biotechnol-
ogies, it permits promulgation of rules to protect humans and per-
haps other living entities from the risks of infection caused by ge-
netic engineering operations.
The Public Health Service and FDA have used the "unusually
broad delegation of authority [under section 361] in a variety of
ways to regulate drinking water, milk and animal products, shell-
fish and pet turtles that might pose a danger to public health."30 6
The agencies even have regulated noninfectious materials. This ag-
gressive regulatory posture shows a clear "'preference for preven-
tion of the occurrence of any risk, rather than control of the spread
of infection.' "o307 Because of the unusually broad scope of section
361 and its use to regulate a wide variety of products and activi-
ties, conceivably the provision could serve to protect workers in
fermentation facilities and to regulate large-scale applications of
305. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
306. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE, SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., OVERSIGHT REPORT: RECOMBI-
NANT DNA RESEARCH AND ITS APPLICATIONS 24-25 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as
OVERSIGHT REPORT]; 3 NIH DOCUMENTS, supra note 32, at A-258-59.
307. OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 306, at 25 (quoting Mr. Frank Press, Office of
Science and Technology Policy Director).
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genetically engineered micro-organisms.308 The courts have upheld
broad interpretations of section 361 "based primarily on the need
to prevent exposing the public to contagious diseases." 309 In addi-
tion, although a Senate subcommittee and an interagency commit-
tee organized by the Secretary of HHS-then Health, Education,
and Welfare-discovered policy problems with the use of section
361, they did not find any fatal legal flaws in the section as it ap-
plied to the regulation of rDNA research. 1
On the other hand, section 361 refers only to communicable
diseases affecting human beings. Presumably, some genetic engi-
neering technologies could pose a risk of injury to plants, animals,
or the environment, but not to humans. While damage to the envi-
ronment often manifests itself in the form of public health
problems, other ecological spoilage, such as the destruction of wild-
life habitats or wilderness, has at best only a tenuous link to the
public health. Arguably, however, once an agency has established
jurisdiction over a substance it should have authority under the
NEPA also to protect the environment.3 11 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment might be able to protect nonhuman animals and plants
through cooperation with the Secretary of Agriculture, who could
intervene under the animal quarantine laws' 12 and the Federal
Plant Pest Act. 13 These statutes are both similar in purpose and
structure to section 361.
Of greater concern than the existence of statutory authority is
the government's ability to construct an effective regulatory sys-
tem for genetic technologies using the PHSA. Its use by agencies to
prescribe health and environmental standards, certify research fa-
cilities, or register technologies would be unprecedented. The stat-
ute would not limit the power of state and local governments to
impose standards at variance with the federal requirements. The
308. If FDA did exercise its authority under § 361 to protect workers, it thereby might
divest OSHA of jurisdiction to regulate in that area. See Organized Migrants in Community
Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1976). For
commentary on this subject, see Comment, Farmworkers in Jeopardy: OSHA, EPA and the
Pesticide Hazard, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1975); Comment, Interpreting OSHA's Pre-emption
Clause: Farmworkers as a Case Study, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1509 (1980).
309. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Author-
ity of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, supra note 148, at 647; see Louisi-
ana v. Matthews, 427 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. La. 1977).
310. See OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 306, at 23-24.
311. See id. at 43; McGarity, supra note 270; supra notes 268-77 & 298 and accompa-
nying text.
312. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114, 114b, 123, 134a (1976).
313. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 150bb, 150dd (1976).
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criminal penalties in section 361, which are its exclusive remedies,
generally would be inappropriate for all but the most serious will-
ful violations. Nevertheless, HHS may contain the greatest reser-
voir of expertise for regulating the infective risks of genetic engi-
neering technologies. Moreover, the Secretary or Surgeon General
would not be encumbered by specific statutory requirements in
promulgating, revising, or rescinding regulations. These officials
would have maximum flexibility under section 361 to select the
most appropriate regulatory strategies for various genetic engineer-
ing technologies.
3. Wastes
Numerous statutes give EPA authority to regulate virtually all
aspects of the processing, discharge, and disposal of waste materi-
als that result from biotechnologies 14 Except for the potentially
infective nature of some biotechnology wastes, this aspect of the
newly developing industry poses few unique regulatory problems.
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to promul-
gate emission standards for hazardous air pollutants.-" 5 Before
EPA can regulate genetically engineered micro-organisms under
this section, it first must determine that a micro-organism, its
products, or by-products are hazardous air pollutants. Although
the burden on EPA is not exceptionally heavy, the agency still
must produce some evidence that the waste disposal into the envi-
ronment creates a health risk.1 If EPA were to discover that a
firm was using a micro-organism that the agency could characterize
as a hazardous pollutant, EPA probably could ensure adequate
physical containment through a media quality-based ambient air
standard or a technology-based design equipment or operational
standard because these requirements all include an "ample margin
of safety.31 7 Although an organism that escaped a fermentation
314. See supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981). Hazardous air pollutants are those noncriteria
pollutants that EPA determines "may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." Id. §
7412(a)(1). If prescription or enforcement of an emissions standard is infeasible for a partic-
ular pollutant, EPA instead may promulgate a design, equipment, work practice, operational
standard, or combination thereof. Id. § 7412(e).
316. The procedures for promulgating a hazardous air pollutant standard, however,
are tedious and time consuming, and EPA is reluctant to employ them. The more likely
alternative is for EPA to regulate potentially hazardous genetically engineered micro-organ-
isms under the TSCA. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
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vessel probably would not travel very far in the air, it would qual-
ify as an air pollutant, which consists of "any air pollution agent
. .. [including any] biological . ..substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." 18 Since airborne
exposure to hazardous micro-organisms probably would effect
workers first, the OSHAct may be the more appropriate vehicle for
this regulation.319
Relying on the Clean Water Act, EPA has promulgated efflu-
ent limitations and new source performance standards for the
pharmaceutical industry that specify the amounts of conventional
pollutants (BOD, COD, and pH) a company may emit into the
navigable waters by new and existing fermentation processes.
3 20
These limitations would not apply to new sources and modified ex-
isting sources that employ genetically engineered micro-organisms
to produce products other than pharmaceuticals, although EPA
could promulgate limits for these processes in the future. Since any
source that discharges pollutants into the navigable waters must
have a permit under section 402 of the Clean Water Act,32 state or
federal authorities can prescribe technology-based effluent limita-
tions for individual sources for all pollutants discharged from facil-
ities employing genetic engineering technologies.
While industrial fermentation technologies likely will produce
conventional water pollutants, EPA's regulation of these effluents
does not address directly an organism's toxicity. Section 301(b)(2),
however, does require EPA to prescribe technology-based effluent
limitations and guidelines for designated toxic substances reflect-
ing the "best available technology" including zero discharge.3 22 At
present, the list of designated chemicals does not contain any orga-
nisms with genetically engineered molecules, but EPA may add to
that list if it so desires. In determining whether to list a substance,
EPA must take into account the toxicity of the pollutant, its per-
sistence, and its degradability.
32
-
Section 307 of the Clean Water Act also empowers EPA to
promulgate toxic effluent standards, which are more stringent than
318. Id. § 7602(g).
319. If EPA does decide to regulate emissions of micro-organisms under any of its
statutory authorities with the object of protecting workers, then OSHA probably would have
no power to address that subject matter. See supra note 308.
320. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
321. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976); see supra text accompanying note 183,
322. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
323. See id. § 1317(a)(1).
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toxic effluent limitations.324 These standards are water quality-
based and must provide an ample margin of safety.325 The essen-
tial difference between toxic effluent limitations and toxic effluent
standards is that limitations are technology-based whereas stan-
dards are media quality-based. Either approach effectively could
regulate the discharge of micro-organisms containing rDNA mole-
cules, their products, and by-products should EPA determine that
these organisms constitute toxic pollutants.
The solid wastes that genetic technology firms and laborato-
ries generate, store, transport, treat, and dispose of could face
stringent EPA regulation under the RCRA if the agency were to
label them hazardous. 2 6 To regulate all the wastes that could fit
within the broad hazardous waste definition, EPA has promulgated
detailed regulations that became effective beginning in November
1980.327 Although the regulations do not address specifically wastes
from laboratories or industries engaged in genetic engineering ac-
tivities, the rules easily could apply to the disposal of much of the
solid wastes that both research and commercial applications of the
new technology generate.
EPA designed the regulations to track hazardous wastes from
the point of generation to ultimate storage, treatment, or disposal,
and to render accountable all parties that have any significant role
in waste generation or management. 28 The most important charac-
teristics of a hazardous waste are ignitability, corrosivity, reactiv-
ity, and "extraction procedure" (EP) toxicity.2 EPA establishes
standards for generators, transporters, and disposers of hazardous
324. Id. ] 131]7(a)(2).
325. See generally Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 73 (D.C. Cir.
1978) ("ample margin of safety" is "guiding principle"); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91,
110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (economic impact and technical feasibility not a condition to safety
standard). Before promulgating toxic effluent standards, EPA must consider the extent to
which effective control is achievable under other regulatory authority. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)
(1976).
326. Section 1004(5) of subtitle C of the RCRA defines hazardous waste as
a solid waste or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentra-
tion, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-(A) cause, or significantly
contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapaci-
tating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed
of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976). See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
327. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-175, 177 (1982); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122-125, 260-267 (1982).
328. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 264.1 (1982).
329. EP toxicity is a procedure in which components are extracted from wastes in the
same way that leaching action occurs in landfills. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1982).
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wastes. 330 Hazardous waste handlers must comply with an exten-
sive manifest system and file annual reports. 31 EPA must approve
all storage, treatment, and disposal facilities,332 and regulations re-
quire packaging, labeling, marking, and placarding of the waste in
accordance with EPA regulations.
333
Although EPA has failed to propose any RCRA regulations
that directly affect the solid waste products of genetic engineering
research or manufacturing, the rules do address several other is-
sues that might be important in the disposal of solid wastes associ-
ated with genetic technologies. The open dumping regulations3 "
require disposal facilities to minimize the "on-site population of
disease vectors . . through periodic application of cover material
or other techniques as appropriate so as to protect public
health."33 5 Arguably, this regulation is applicable to genetically en-
gineered micro-organisms used in research, manufacturing, or
waste water treatment, because the organisms could be disease
vectors and disposed of at a landfill. EPA, however, currently has
limited the definition of disease vector to "rodents, flies, and mos-
quitos capable of transmitting disease to humans."336 EPA, of
course, could extend this definition to include micro-organisms,
but it does not presently intend to do so.
EPA has proposed listing as hazardous wastes infectious
wastes that health care facilities, laboratories handling etiologic
agents, and sewage treatment facilities generate, unless the wastes
are sterilized or incinerated pursuant to EPA requirements.3
When the agency initiated this proposal, EPA did not have a crite-
rion for determining whether a waste was infectious. EPA claims
that it now has developed a criterion but is deferring action on
infectious wastes until it can identify the treatment methods that
could exempt wastes from the regulation. 38 The agency could at-
tempt to include in the definition of infectious wastes those wastes
from facilities employing genetic engineering technologies. EPA,
however, has not given any indication that it intends to regulate
330. See 40 G.F.R. § 262 (1982).
331. Id. § 263.20-.22.
332. Id. §§ 264, 265.
333. See 49 C.F.R. §§-172, 173, 178, 179 (1982).
334. Section 4005(c) of the RCRA prohibits open dumping. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c) (1976).
335. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-.6(a) (1982).
336. Id. § 257.3-.6(c)(2).
337. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,087 (1980).
338. Id. at 33,086.
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rDNA waste disposal activities in this manner.33
The foregoing description of existing statutes demonstrates
that EPA has more than adequate authority to regulate wastes
from industrial uses of genetic engineering. The primary task for
the agency will be to monitor the emerging technologies to deter-
mine whether their wastes pose any unique regulatory problems
that the EPA best can address using a case by case approach.
V. THE NEED FOR A SEPARATE STATUTE
The foregoing examination of the wide variety of relevant stat-
utory authority demonstrates that federal agencies probably have
sufficient regulatory power to acquire information relevant to the
risks posed by industrial use of genetic engineering technologies
and to protect the public health and the environment if risk as-
sessments demonstrate that regulation is necessary. The current
statutory arsenal, however, is not without its weaknesses. Some of
the most effective statutes, such as the FFDCA and the FIFRA,
apply only to risks associated with the manufacture, distribution,
and use of particular products. Other more comprehensive stat-
utes-the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the RCRA, section
361 of the PHSA, and the OSHAct, for example-relate to particu-
lar stages of the production process or to particular risks. Only the
TSCA provides a comprehensive weapon that can target all risks
and all stages of production. Section 5 of the TSCA provides a ve-
hicle for a comprehensive registry of products, by-products, and
perhaps hosts and vectors. Section 4 gives EPA the authority to
require the health and safety testing that is essential to any ade-
339. The ocean dumping law unconditionally prohibits the dumping of any radiologi-
cal, chemical, or biological warfare agents, or of any high-level radioactive wastes. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1411(b) (1976); see supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. The statute also prohibits
the dumping of any other kinds of material, although EPA may issue permits to dump
materials, including some solid waste, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, if it
determines that such dumping will not "unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,
welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentiali-
ties." 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976). EPA must consider the need for the proposed dumping,
the effects of such dumping on health and on economic, esthetic, and recreational values,
the effect of dumping on fisheries, fishing resources, as well as on plankton, fish, shellfish,
wildlife, shorelines, beaches, and on marine ecosystems generally. The administrator must
also evaluate the persistence of the effects, and the impact of dumping particular volumes
and concentrations of materials. See id.
Violations of the law or of the regulations that EPA has promulgated are punishable by
a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation, which the administrator shall
assess. Id. § 1415(a). The administrator may revoke or suspend any dumping permit upon




The linchpin of a regulatory strategy that relies on the TSCA
is the validity of the assumption that the DNA in a micro-organ-
ism is a chemical substance or mixture. 40 The argument for regu-
lating micro-organisms through their DNA is convincing, albeit
risky.3 41 Hence, the only way to ensure adequate monitoring and
regulation of the emerging biotechnologies may be to enact a stat-
ute that specifically addresses those technologies. A separate stat-
ute would give Congress or a state legislature the opportunity to
craft reporting, testing, and regulatory requirements to the precise
needs of the new technology, rather than force an agency to at-
tempt to fit the issues into an unsatisfactory statutory mold. By
enacting new legislation, Congress also could choose the appropri-
ate regulatory agency or create a new one. Because it would focus
exclusively upon a single technology, the agency or subagency unit
rapidly could acquire expertise in the technology and its risks.
Strong arguments, however, exist against creating a new regu-
latory regime. Since the relevant technologies are new and rapidly
evolving, disagreement undoubtedly will arise over what consti-
tutes the appropriate elements for the statute. A changing legisla-
tive problem is not always conducive to intelligent draftsmanship.
Although precedent abounds for aiming regulatory regimes at par-
ticular technologies-for example, nuclear power and radio and
television communications-the technique has important disad-
vantages. The close interaction between the agency or subagency
unit and the regulated industry could breed a familiarity that ulti-
mately could mature into captivity.3 4 2 On the other hand, the regu-
latory program, to justify its existence, might feel pressure to regu-
late unnecessarily. Finally, absent some crisis or other incident
that would bring the potential risks of new biotechnologies force-
fully to the attention of the public, the issue probably would not
generate enough enthusiasm to propel a bill through Congress.
Existing agencies should not view the possibility that a new
statutory authority better could perform the monitoring and, if
340. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
341. A court that faces the reductio ad absurdum argument that the TSCA is a substi-
tute for Title 18 of the United States Code because we are all the slaves of our DNA well
might refuse to allow EPA to extend its authority over toxic substances to control over
organisms that produce toxic substances.
342. See R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION (1972); Cameron, Federal
Regulatory Agencies-The Need for a Broader Constituency, 4 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 50,132 (1974); Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participa-
tion in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525, 528 (1972).
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necessary, the regulatory functions as an excuse to forego using
their own existing power. As the technologies grow and mature, the
probability of undetected risk increases and the agencies may find
themselves in their all-too-familiar reactive postures. Ultimately,
the wisest policy may be for Congress to enact a special statute.
Until it does, however, the relevant agencies, especially NIOSH
and EPA, should use their authority to monitor the new technol-
ogy in operation. If this power later proves insufficient, then the
agencies may petition Congress for new or expanded authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid development of genetic engineering technology pro-
vides a rare opportunity to assess the risks of an emerging technol-
ogy and to determine the extent to which that activity should be
subject to governmental regulation. In the past society often has
failed to anticipate the problems of a new technology. Federal
agencies whose purpose is to protect the public health and environ-
ment have allowed entrepreneurs to develop processes and market
products until data generated by independent sources-university
scientists or, more recently, public interest group "watch-
dogs"-have revealed the hazards that the technology and its
products pose to society. Speculation about the dangers then re-
ceives widespread publicity as the public urges regulators to use
their authority to protect society.
Existing agencies probably already have the power to avoid
this reactive posture and require firms to generate information
concerning the hazards of these new technologies before they come
on line. EPA in particular can assemble a large repository of infor-
mation on the emerging biotechnologies by using its TSCA testing
and monitoring powers. FDA has similar authority for biotechnolo-
gies aimed at producing drugs and other products subject to its
jurisdiction. To prepare adequately for the almost inevitable detri-
mental side effects of these new technologies, EPA should begin
immediately to assemble the expertise that it needs to assess risks
and monitor these technologies. If EPA does not take the lead in
this effort, FDA should do so, and if neither agency begins to mon-
itor in place technologies for risks, then Congress specifically
should empower EPA to monitor and require testing for
biotechnologies.
If the risk assessments that result from testing and monitoring
reveal that these technologies pose unreasonable risks to human
beings and the environment, EPA, OSHA, and FDA have a wide
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array of regulatory authorities available to address those potential
dangers. A court, however, may limit EPA's authority by determin-
ing that the genetically altered DNA in a micro-organism is not a
chemical substance. To ensure against this possibility, Congress
could amend the TSCA to give EPA explicit authority to address
the infective risks of new biotechnologies. Congress also should ap-
propriate to the relevant agencies adequate resources to implement
their data gathering and risk assessment functions. Without mone-
tary and personnel resources, the regulatory agencies simply will
not accomplish these important objectives, and they will have lost
the opportunity to oversee the unfolding of the dramatic new ge-
netic engineering technologies.
